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Abstract  
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  A significant amount of evidence suggests that gender inequality in the developing 
world negatively impacts women and girls’ health, education and future wage potential. 
This thesis investigates whether households in South Africa discriminated against their 
girl children, in favor of their boy children. Additionally, I will investigate whether 
household heads favored children matching their own sex. Using the 1st wave of the 
National Income Dynamics Study and Angus Deaton’s outlay-equivalence ratio method, I 
will estimate the impact, 8 age and sex categories have on their household’s adult goods 
expenditure. I found statistically significant but practically insignificant evidence, from a 
sample of poor female headed households, suggesting a preference for 0-4 year old 
boys over 0-4 year old girls. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Historically, girls in the developing world do not always receive an equitable 
share of household resources (Saha 2013 Kingdon 2005 Parpiev et. al. 2012 and Gibson 
and Rozelle 2004). Research has also found that a lack of equitable household resource 
distribution has a significant impact on women and girls, affecting their health, 
education and future earning potential (Baliamoune-Lutz et. al. 2009 Garg et. al. 1998 
Agbodji et. al. 2013 and Dickerson et. al. 2013). Unfortunately, few datasets have 
directly examined how household heads apportioned resources amongst all their 
households’ residents. Without information, directly on how households allocated their 
resources, it is difficult to evaluate whether there is any evidence suggesting that those 
household discriminated against their girl children. However, Angus Deaton 
circumvented that data gap with the outlay-equivalence ratio methodology he proposed 
in Deaton (1989). 
Angus Deaton’s outlay-equivalence ratio methodology works by evaluating the 
impact different types of residents have on their household’s adult goods expenditure. 
Adult goods are goods, like alcohol and cigarettes, which an adult consumes but a child 
would not. Depending on the gender of their children, the changes in that household’s 
adult goods expenditure, produced by their addition to that household, are considered 
indirect evidence, suggestive of discrimination. The outlay-equivalence ratio method 
proposed in Deaton (1989) presents an opportunity to exploit existing datasets and look 
for evidence of household level discrimination against girl children. 
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The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), a panel data survey examining the 
urban, rural and suburban conditions of South African life, does not contain information 
directly on how household heads divided resources amongst their household’s 
residents. However, combined with the method proposed in Deaton (1989), this dataset 
provides an opportunity to research whether South African households discriminated 
against their girl children. Using the 1st wave, administered in 2008, and the outlay-
equivalence methodology, I investigated whether South African households 
discriminated against their girl children in favor of their boy children. Additionally, I 
investigated if there was any evidence, suggesting that a household head favored 
children matching their sex.   
The paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 describes the 
background of economic and gender inequality in South Africa, Section 3 presents a 
review of relevant literature, Section 4 describes the data and samples used for my 
analysis, Section 5 provides a description of the econometric method, Section 6 presents 
the results from the analysis, Section 7 contains a discussion on the significance of my 
results and Section 8 presents the conclusions I drew from them. 
2 South African Gender and Economic Inequality 
 
With a 2016 GDP estimated at $736.3 billion, South Africa has one of the largest 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.1However, while they are part of one of the largest 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, the South African people still face significant 
economic inequality. Research by Orthofer (2016) portrays South Africa as a nation with 
                                                 
1 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html 
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stark wealth and income inequality. She found that the top 10% of South Africans own 
90-95% of all wealth and 50-55% of all labor income in South Africa. Additionally, South 
Africa has an unemployment rate of 26.8% and has 36% of its population living below 
the poverty line.2Despite living in one of the wealthiest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
much of South Africa’s population live impoverished lives.  
In addition to their issues with wealth and income inequality, South African 
society still struggles with their attitude towards gender equality. It is official national 
policy for the South African state to prevent discrimination based on gender. Chapter 2, 
Section 9, Subsection 3 of the South African constitution states “The state may not 
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex… and birth”.3 Furthermore, the South African constitution 
also declares “No person may fairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).”4 Despite these official protections, a 
strong current of sexism runs through South African society. A 2016 IPSOS poll found 
that 40% of South African adults strongly agreed with the statement that “a women’s 
place is in the house”, up from 33% in 2015 (Ipsos 2016). Additionally, that IPSOS poll 
found that in 2016, 25% of South African adults strongly agreed that “a boy has more 
rights to education than a girl”, up from 21% in 2015 (Ipsos 2016). Despite official 
protections, discrimination against women and girls is still pervasive in South African 
society. 
                                                 
2 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html 
3 http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#9 
4 http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#9 
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3 Literature Review 
 
3.1 Theory of the Household 
 
Exploring whether South African households had significant preferences for their 
boys or girls requires a discussion on the relevant economics literature of how 
households operate and make decisions. Economists, Paul Samuelson and Gary Becker 
contributed significantly to the foundational literature on how households make 
resource decisions.  
Samuelson (1956) rejected the conventional notion that all households operated 
under a single, sovereign head, making decisions they thought best for all their 
residents. However, neither did Samuelson (1956) believe that households consistently 
operated through unanimous consent. He supposed that households practically 
operated somewhere between a sovereign dictatorship and unanimous consent. He 
advanced the belief that residents within households worked together altruistically. 
Every household member’s preferences blend with each other’s through a social welfare 
function, accounting for the merits of each resident’s level of consumption. 
Theoretically, as households seek to maximize their utility, through those social welfare 
functions, each resident’s required consumption will be satisfied, without the need for a 
dictatorship or unanimous consent.  
Like Samuelson (1956), Becker (1974) also contributed to literature on 
household decision making. Becker (1974) advanced a model where a household’s 
interactions operate through an individual’s social income. Social income is the sum of a 
person’s monetary income with the value of their social environment, multiplied by 
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some shadow price. Becker’s (1974) model includes the value of actions, which affect an 
individual’s self-perceived social status, into that person’s utility function. 
In Becker’s (1974) model of the household, a single head, who cares enough 
about all the residents of their household, transfers resources to all the persons under 
their care. However, the head of the household does not act dictatorially. They are so 
concerned with the welfare of their household, that they incorporate every resident’s 
utility functions into a single “family’s” utility function, restraining their potential to act 
arbitrarily. All other residents of the household, considering their own social income, 
strive to maximize their family’s utility to improve or maintain their transfer of 
household resources. 
3.2 History of Measuring Child Costs 
 
Investigating individual consumption within households is an invasive and 
disruptive task. Because of those difficulties, nearly all household surveys just have 
information on general household consumption. That lack of direct data on individual 
consumption within households and a concern that women and girls in the developing 
world were not receiving an equitable share of household resources, prompted Angus 
Deaton to develop his outlay-equivalence ratios methodology.  
Before Angus Deaton used outlay-equivalence ratios as a tool to evaluate 
whether households discriminated against their girl children, others came before him, 
laying the groundwork for his research. Ernst Engel, a 19th century German economist 
and statistician, most famously known for having developed the Engel curve, was the 
earliest developer of an empirical method capable of measuring the costs children 
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impose on their households. Assuming that household food expenditure accounted for 
household welfare, Engel used data from Ducpétiaux’s 1855 survey of Belgian 
households, observing that increases in a household’s income lead to disproportionately 
smaller increases in that household’s food expenditure. Later coined as “Engel’s Law”, 
this phenomenon asserted that increases in household size do not always lead to 
declines in welfare (Chai and Moneta 2010). Using this phenomenon and the 
assumption that household food expenditure accounted for household welfare, as 
theoretical underpinnings, Engel inferred that the cost of children could be calculated by 
estimating the amount of money required to move a household back to pre-child levels 
of food expenditure (Deaton 1986).  
In addition to the work by Ernst Engel, Erwin Rothbarth was another early 
contributor in developing a tool which could measure the cost children impose on their 
households. Like Ernst Engel, Erwin Rothbarth was also a German economist and 
statistician, but of the 20th century. Most famously known for his collaboration with 
John Maynard Keynes, Rothbarth developed a method for measuring the costs children 
impose on their households. Assuming a household’s expenditure on adult goods was a 
welfare measure for that household’s adults, Rothbarth’s method relies on observing 
the impact children have on their household’s adult goods expenditure. Adult goods are 
any goods, like alcohol and cigarettes, which an adult consumes but a child will not. His 
method works by calculating the amount of money needed to restore a household to 
its’ pre-child levels of adult goods expenditure. That sum of money is the cost that 
Rothbarth assumed children impose on their household (Deaton 1986). The work done 
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by Ernst Engel and Erwin Rothbarth was instrumental in helping Angus Deaton develop 
his outlay-equivalence ratio methodology.  
Using Erwin Rothbarth’s theory of the demographically separable adult good, 
Angus Deaton initially tested his approach, examining whether households in Thailand 
and Cote d’Ivoire discriminated against their girl children. However, while his analysis 
could not find evidence of discrimination in Thai and Ivorian households, he had 
developed a novel method for evaluating evidence of gender bias, at the household 
level (Deaton 1989).  
3.3 Gender Inequality 
 
Research by Baliamoune-Lutz et. al. (2009) and Pallitto et. al. (2004) on the 
effects of gender inequality has reached a similar conclusion; gender inequality 
generates significant negative costs wherever it exists. Using a logistic regression 
analysis, Pallitto et. al. (2004) looked for evidence suggestive of an association between 
gender inequality, unintended pregnancies and intimate partner violence in Colombian 
municipalities. They found that women living in areas with high rates of patriarchal 
control faced a significantly higher risk of having an unintended pregnancy. In addition, 
Pallitto et. al. (2004) found that women living in regions with high rates of intimate 
partner violence had a significantly higher risk of having an unintended pregnancy than 
women who did not live in areas with high rates of intimate partner violence. Examining 
data from Sub-Saharan African and Arab countries, Baliamoune-Lutz et. al. (2009) 
attempted to determine whether gender inequality had a negative impact on those 
countries’ economic growth. Using the ratio of 15-24-year-old literate women to men as 
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their measure for gender inequality, they found that inequalities in the Arab countries’ 
literacy rates had a significantly higher negative impact on economic growth than it did 
in the Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition to the findings from Baliamoune-Lutz 
et. al. (2009) and Pallitto et. al. (2004), research by Chaudhry (2007), Umesh (2012) and 
Kaya et. al. (2012) also concluded that gender inequality persists around the world and 
poses significant consequences to all affected women and girls.  
Research into the gender discrimination experience of Sub-Saharan African 
women and girls (Agbodji et. al. 2013 Dickerson et. al. 2013 and Garg et. al. 1998) has 
concluded that they do face significant and consequential discrimination. Agbodji et. al. 
(2013) examined whether men and women in Togo and Burkina Faso, had equitable 
access to credit, employment, education, housing, assets and basic utilities. They found 
that women had significantly worse access than men, for every item examined. Looking 
at data from the 1988-1989 Ghana Living Stands Survey, Garg et. al. (1998) wanted to 
determine to what extent Ghanaian households favored boys over girls. They used 
several health indicators, including stunting, height-for-age and weight-for-age, as 
measures to indicate whether boys received a greater share of household resources 
than girls did. They found that on average, households with a boy child who only had 
sisters fared significantly better than households where the boy only had brothers. Garg 
et. al. (1998) explained how the discrimination operated, asserting that in countries 
where society favors boys, boys benefit from having only sisters and no brothers 
because they draw household resources away from girl children. Looking at data 
covering 19 Sub-Saharan African nations, Dickerson et. al. (2013) attempted to find 
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evidence suggesting a gender gap in boy’s and girl’s performances on primary school 
math tests. In every country, including South Africa, Dickerson et. al (2013) found 
significant gaps between boy’s and girl’s performances on primary school math tests. 
Dickerson’s et. al. (2013) findings, that a gap exists in math performance between boys 
and girls, in context of Curi et. al. (2014) who found evidence in Brazil suggestive of the 
positive impact academic performance has on future wages, suggests that a girl’s future 
wage potential in those Sub-Saharan African countries will be worse than a boy’s. There 
is significant additional research (Agesa et. al. 2013 Senadza 2012 and Hakura et. al. 
2016) in line with Garg et. al. (1998), Dickerson et. al. (2013) and Agbodji et. al. (2013), 
concluding that gender inequality persists in Sub-Saharan Africa and poses significant 
consequences.  
Besides the moral necessity of ensuring equal opportunity for persons from 
every gender, research by Mitra et. al. (2015), Wu et. al. (2016) and Melander (2005) 
has shown that pursuing gender equality benefits society. Examining data from a panel 
of 101 countries, Mitra et. al. (2015) looked at the impact gender equality has on a 
nation’s economic growth. They found evidence suggesting that gender equality has 
positive impact on a country’s economic growth. Additionally, Mitra et. al. (2015) found 
that depending on a country’s stage of economic development, countries potentially 
benefited more from policies aimed at achieving equality of opportunity or equality of 
participation. Developing countries experienced more benefits when pursuing policies 
that aimed to achieve equality of opportunity and developed nations saw greater gains 
from policies aimed at achieving equality of economic and political participation. Wu et. 
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al. (2016) examined Chilean manufacturing firms, looking for evidence on gender 
equality’s impact on firm productivity. They found that greater gender equality within 
firms did have a positive impact on a firm’s productivity. Specifically, they found among 
firms with less than 50 employees that higher gender equality amongst their high-skill 
employees improved productivity, and among firms with more than 50 employees, 
higher gender equality amongst their low-skill employees improved productivity. 
Analyzing data collected from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, Melander (2005) 
attempted to determine if gender equality was associated with a decline in intrastate 
armed conflict. Using whether a state had a female political leader, female 
representation in government and the ratio of women to men’s higher educational 
attainment as measures for gender equality, Melander (2005) found that his measures 
were negatively associated with the level of intrastate armed conflict in a nation. In 
addition to the research conducted by Melander (2005) Wu et. al. (2016) and Mitra et. 
al (2015), findings by Caprioli (2005), Lakshmi et. al. (2012) and Dollar et. al. (2001) all 
found evidence suggesting that gender equality has a beneficial effect on society.  
3.4 Discrimination at the Household Level 
 
Research into household level gender discrimination, when evaluated with direct 
methods, has found strong evidence that male headed households, in the developing 
world, discriminate against their girl children. Direct examinations of households in India 
and Mexico (Antman 2015 Kingdon 2005 and Saha 2013) have all had the same findings; 
a child’s gender does have a significant impact on their share of household resources. 
Antman (2015) utilized difference-in-differences along with fixed effects, to examine 
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possible evidence of discrimination in Mexico’s migrant households. When the male 
household head migrated, their wife decided how household resources were allocated 
in their stead. Antman (2015) found that when their wife had this power, they directed 
a larger share of resources towards girl children. However, when the male household 
head returned from migration, their wife lost their newly held decision making power 
and the share of resources directed to girl children were allocated back to boy children.  
Similarly, in India, Saha (2013) examined household discrimination in the context 
of education expenditure in Indian households. Applying the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method, he found evidence, suggestive of widespread household level 
discrimination with the amount of education expenditure that girl children received. The 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method works by dividing the wage differences between 
two groups into a part explained by characteristics associated with productivity, such as 
education and work experience and a part that cannot be accounted by characteristics 
typically with productivity. The portion of wage differences that cannot be accounted 
for characteristics typically associated with productivity is assumed to have been caused 
by a gender bias (Jann 2008). While Saha (2013) found significant discrimination in every 
Indian state, the lowest levels of gender discrimination for household spending on 
education were found amongst the tribal communities of rural and urban India. Saha 
(2013) explains these findings by asserting that many of the tribal communities of India 
have matriarchal systems, which potentially look more favorably on their girl children. 
As evidenced by Saha (2013) and Antman (2015), the head of a household’s gender can 
have a significant impact on the patterns of household resource allocation.  
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When evaluated with outlay-equivalence ratios, studies into household level 
discrimination have had mixed results. Research by Parpiev et. al. (2012) and Gibson and 
Rozelle (2004) all found evidence suggesting households discriminated against their girl 
children. Gibson and Rozelle (2004) examined discrimination in Papua New Guinea, 
finding in rural communities that additional boy children significantly reduced their 
household’s adult goods expenditure while additional girl children did not. Parpiev et. al. 
(2012) found evidence suggestive of discrimination inside of Uzbek households. They 
found, through household consumption of alcohol and tobacco, evidence of 
discrimination against girl children. However, studies by Deaton (1989), Haddad and 
Reardon (1993) and Subramanian et. al. (1991), using the same outlay-equivalence ratio 
methodology, could not find evidence supporting household level discrimination against 
girl children.  
Research, specifically into the Sub-Saharan African experience with household 
level discrimination, when evaluated with the outlay-equivalence ratio methodology, 
has also had mixed results. Angus Deaton tested his outlay-equivalence ratio approach 
in Deaton (1989), examining evidence of household level discrimination in Cote d’Ivoire. 
He found no evidence to suggest that Ivorian households discriminated against their girl 
children. Haddad and Reardon (1993) advanced Deaton’s (1989) outlay-equivalence 
ratio approach in their own study on Burkina Faso, disaggregating along urban and rural 
settings. However, they could not find evidence suggesting Burkinabe households 
favored boys over girls. Arndt et. al. (2006) applied the same outlay-equivalence ratio 
method in Mozambique, examining whether household heads discriminated against 
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non-biologically related child residents. In poor households, they found evidence 
suggesting discrimination against children not biologically related to the household 
head, in urban and rural settings. The mixed experience researchers have had with 
Deaton’s (1989) outlay-equivalence ratio methodology, in Sub-Saharan African 
countries, suggests an opportunity for additional research.  
Like in Saha (2013), Kingdon (2005) also evaluated evidence of child gender 
discrimination in the context of education expenditure, but used both a direct and 
indirect methodology. With fixed effects, a direct methodology, Kingdon (2005) found 
evidence suggesting that Indian girls received significantly less of their household’s 
expenditure on education than Indian boys did. Discrimination typically manifested itself 
through non-enrollment of girl children, implying zero household expenditure on their 
education. However, using an indirect methodology, Kingdon (2005) could not find the 
same results.  
Kingdon (2005) noted several flaws in the indirect Engel curve approach, which 
she used in her own study. She noted that the Engel curve approach, similar to Angus 
Deaton’s outlay-equivalence ratios, suffered from a functional form error, limiting the 
impact household gender composition has on the decision to enroll and how much to 
spend on schooling. Kingdon (2005) also noted that the aggregation of household data 
prevented accurate measurement of gender bias. She recommended that aggregated 
household expenditure data can still be of use if one was to model the hurdle. Hurdle 
models work by estimating an equation for whether someone will commit to a purchase 
and in the instances where they’ve committed to the purchase, thus clearing the hurdle, 
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a separate independent equation for how much they’ll spend on that purchase. Kingdon 
(2005) used a hurdle model to create an equation for whether Indian households spent 
money on education and a separate equation which models how much expenditure 
those households, which cleared the hurdle, will spend on education. 
3.5 Differential Parental Investment 
 
Through studying the experiences of women and girls in developing nations, 
economists Antman (2015), Kingdon (2005) and Saha (2013), among many others have 
made significant contributions towards the research on gender inequality in the 
developing world. However, research is a communal activity, incorporating many 
different perspectives and economics is just one of the frameworks researchers have 
used to answer questions on gender inequality. Evolutionary biologists and 
psychologists have also examined gender inequality, laying much of initial groundwork 
and generating a theoretical explanation for why household level gender inequality 
happens.  
Trivers and Willard (1973) advanced a general model, potentially explaining why 
some households in the developing world, do not equitably invest in their children. 
Typically tested on non-human mammals, when applied to humans, the strength of two 
assumptions is examined. Triver’s and Willard’s hypothesis (TWH) assumes that a child’s 
sex is determined by the social, health and resource status of their parents and that 
parents will differentially invest in their children, depending on those metrics. 
Specifically, Trivers and Willard (1973) assumed that poorer parents will have more girl 
children and will invest more in their girls, while richer parents will have more boy 
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children and will invest more in their boys. Other researchers (Hopcroft 2005 Davis et. 
al. 2007 Guggenheim et. al. 2007 and Pollet et. al. 2009) have empirically tested these 
assumptions. 
Research by Hopcroft (2005) and Davis et. al. (2007) empirically tested the 
strength of the assumptions of TWH, when applied to parental investment decisions in 
the United States. Davis et. al. (2007) looked at a sample of 103 Southwestern United 
States six-month-old babies and their mothers. To test TWH, they measured the 
mother’s attitude towards ideal baby size, the number of weeks they breast fed and the 
child’s weight at six months. Davis et. al.’s (2007) analysis found that poor mothers 
preferred heavier baby girls while rich mothers preferred heavier baby boys, providing 
some evidence in favor of TWH. However, they also found while poor Hispanic mothers 
had heavier baby girls, that poor Caucasian mothers had heavier baby boys, violating an 
assumption of TWH. Using the U.S. General Social Survey, Hopcroft (2005) investigated 
through educational attainment, whether the assumptions for TWH held. They found 
evidence suggesting that the sons of high-status fathers had higher educational 
attainment than their daughters. Hopcroft (2005) also found the complement, finding 
evidence to suggest that the daughters of low-status fathers had higher educational 
attainment than their sons. Their research also found evidence suggesting that high-
status men had, on average, more sons. When applied to the United States, Hopcroft 
(2005) and Davis et. al. (2007) found moderate evidence, suggesting that the 
assumptions for TWH do hold.  
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Studies (Guggenheim et. al. 2007 and Pollet et. al. 2009) which applied Triver’s 
and Willard’s hypothesis specifically to Sub-Saharan African countries, have had mixed 
results. Studying the Demographic and Health Surveys program, administered in 35 
developing countries, of which 21 were Sub-Saharan African countries, Guggenheim et. 
al. (2007) empirically tested the assumptions for TWH. Using the mother’s 
socioeconomic and health status and their last child’s health seeking and prenatal care 
as metrics to measure whether mothers differentially invested amongst their children. 
However, they ultimately found no evidence suggesting that TWH applied to the 
maternal investment decisions in any of 35 countries examined for the Demographic 
and Health Surveys program. Pollet et. al. (2009) examined whether TWH’s sex ratio 
assumption applied to a sample of about 95,000 Rwandan mothers. Specifically, they 
tested whether a wife’s social ranking, within a polygamous marriage, biased the sex 
ratio of their children. Within a polygamous marriage, a wife’s ranking affects their 
share of household resources, meaning each additional wife receives progressively less 
resources than the women before them. They found evidence suggesting that 3rd or 
lower ranked wives had significantly more daughters, than monogamously married 
women or 1st or 2nd ranked wives did. The research (Pollet et. al. 2009 and Guggenheim 
et. al. 2007) done, in Sub-Saharan Africa, to test the assumptions for TWH a is generally 
mixed, casting some doubt but not entirely discounting its’ ability to explain sex ratios 
and parental investment choices.  
However, the different perspectives, from economists and evolutionary 
biologists on household level discrimination, reached mutually exclusive conclusions. 
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The assumptions in TWH and research by Pollet et. al. (2009), Hopcroft (2005) and Davis 
et. al. (2007) all seem to suggest that poor women will invest more in their sons than 
they do in their girls. However, the economist Francisca Antman found, in Antman 
(2015), evidence to suggest that poor women invest more in their girls than in their 
sons. I believe, from the difference in results, there are numerous opportunities for 
future research into household level discrimination.    
Studies by Garg et. al. (1998), Gibson and Rozelle (2004), Kingdon (2005), Saha 
(2013) and Parpiev at. al. (2012) suggest that nations with patriarchal social systems, like 
Ghana, Paupa New Guinea, India and Uzbekistan, favor boys over girls. In addition, 
research by Antman (2015) directly examined an instance, in Mexico, where women, 
who had influence or authority over household decisions in a similarly patriarchal 
society, appeared to favor their girls over their boy children. In my thesis, I assumed that 
South African women, with some measure of authority over household decisions, know 
a societal gender bias exists, affecting their quality of life. I believe that these women 
might have favored their girls over their boys to provide them a resource surplus 
because they know being a woman put them at a severe financial and social 
disadvantage, relative to their male peers.   
I propose to use the 1st wave of the NIDS and Deaton’s (1989) outlay-equivalence 
ratio methodology to evaluate whether South African households discriminated against 
their girl children in favor of their boy children. Additionally, I will disaggregate my 
analysis along the household head’s gender, to uncover if they preferred children who 
matched their sex. To control for the significant wealth and income inequality in South 
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Africa I will create additional samples for both poor and rich households. Findings from 
both Antman (2015) and Saha (2013) support my hypothesis that a household head 
preferred children matching their sex. However, unlike Antman (2015) and Saha (2013), 
my study will directly disaggregate along the household head’s gender in a country 
where women head a significant number of households.  
4 Data and Sample Description 
 
The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) is a panel data survey conducted by 
the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) examining the 
urban, rural and suburban conditions of South African life. Initially administered in 2008, 
the NIDS consists of multiple survey waves, conducted every two years. Presently 
they’ve finished and published a 4th wave and have begun administering a 5th wave. 
In my analysis, I will only use 1 of 4 possible waves from the NIDS. The outlay-
equivalence ratio methodology is a cross-sectional tool, requiring just a single wave’s 
worth of information to evaluate whether South African households discriminated 
against their girl children. Specifically, I will use the 1st wave of the NIDS. Administered 
in 2008, Wave 1 contains information on approximately 28000 individuals, across 7300 
households. Since the NIDS is a panel survey, questionnaires were reissued on every 
subsequent wave to the initial participants. Per the Wave 2 User Manual, surveyors 
found that between Wave 1 and Wave 2, participation had declined by 21.26%. (Brown 
et. al. 2012). Because I wanted as a large sample size as possible for my analysis, I 
decided to use Wave 1. 
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When questioned, respondents were asked to list every resident of their 
household. To qualify as a resident, an individual must have lived in a household for at 
least 15 days during the past 12 months and share from their household’s stock of 
resources. Multiple questionnaires were issued to households who agreed to participate 
in NIDS. Issued to the oldest women of a household, the Household questionnaire 
captured information on the overall welfare of their household. Questions included 
anything from what material their household was built of to whether the main income 
provider had in the past, experienced positive or negative income shocks. Issued to any 
household resident 15 years or older, the Adult questionnaire captured information on 
their general welfare. Adult questionnaires typically asked about the condition of their 
employment and economic status. Given to a caregiver, the Child questionnaire 
captured information on the status of household residents, aged 14 years or younger. 
Their questionnaire typically asked for information on the health and education status 
of children in the respondent’s household. A Proxy questionnaire was offered in 
instances where household residents were not available to participate in NIDS. In their 
place, an available household resident answered questions on the missing resident’s 
behalf. Despite its sound construction, the NIDS does have some quality issues. 
Overall, the NIDS does an excellent job of capturing life in South Africa. However, 
there are significant gaps in in the survey’s non-food expenditure data. For instance, in 
Wave 1, 2148 households reported tobacco consumption but only 1882 households 
reported how much they spent. Levinsohn et. al. (2009) reported that the NIDS used 
expenditure imputation to compensate for instances where a gap existed between a 
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household’s reported consumption and their expenditure on non-food items. Overall, in 
the 1st wave of the NIDS, 191 missing non-food values were fully imputed and 2227 
missing non-food values were partially imputed.   
In the NIDS, assumptions were made for how they would impute missing values. 
For instance, if the number of imputations accounted for more than 40% of the 
observations of an item, no imputation would take place. When a non-food item 
required imputation, the NIDS implemented two techniques, cell median and 
regression. In regression imputation, a model is run with a series of independent and 
demographic variables to predict for the missing value. In cell median imputation, the 
median expenditure on a non-food item from a subgroup of the survey’s population is 
taken. That median is applied as the imputed value for any of the subgroup’s missing 
non-food expenditure values.    
From the 1st wave of the NIDS, I include information on race, gender, marital 
status, education, age, region and the number of household residents, to control for 
differences across households. After cleaning up missing values in the data and selecting 
for the households that had children, my sample had 3528 households. Table 1 provides 
the mean values for those factors. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – All Households, Demographics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
African 0.804 0.397 0.00 1.00 
Coloured 0.140 0.347 0.00 1.00 
Asian/Indian 0.015 0.122 0.00 1.00 
White 0.041 0.198 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.429 0.495 0.00 1.00 
Living with Partner 0.102 0.302 0.00 1.00 
Widow/Widower 0.218 0.413 0.00 1.00 
Divorced/Seperated 0.042 0.200 0.00 1.00 
Never Married 0.209 0.407 0.00 1.00 
Urban Formal 0.412 0.492 0.00 1.00 
Tribal Authority Areas 0.431 0.495 0.00 1.00 
Urban Informal 0.063 0.244 0.00 1.00 
Rural Formal 0.093 0.291 0.00 1.00 
Age 49.584 15.356 15.00 101.00 
Male 0.459 0.498 0.00 1.00 
Female 0.541 0.498 0.00 1.00 
Number of household residents 5.213 2.459 2.00 25.00 
Observations 3528    
 
Observing whether household discriminated against their girl children, requires a 
list of adult goods to examine changes in household expenditure with. I chose personal 
care, alcohol, jewels, gambling, sports, entertainment and cigarettes as a set of goods I 
infer will pass Deaton’s (1989) adult goods test, qualifying as goods demographically 
separable from child consumption. A median South African household allocated just 
1.89% of their total household income to the above listed adult goods. Table 2 gives the 
mean and median values, in Rands, for a South African household’s monthly income and 
expenditure.  
The extreme standard deviations for the expenditure and income variables, 
suggest that the median provides a more accurate measure of the distribution than the 
mean does. In addition, the median values for income and expenditure are significantly 
lower than their respective mean value, implying significant inequality amongst all the 
South African households. It appears that only the South African households near the 
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top of the distribution, with respect to expenditure and income, spent the most on adult 
goods. Given that expenditure on goods like alcohol, cigarettes, entertainment, sports, 
personal care, jewels and gambling is disposable, it is sensible that only the richest 
South African households did spend the most on their consumption.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics – All Households, Expenditure 
      
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal Care Past 30 Days 53.357 10.000 101.998 0.00 2000.00 
Alcohol Past 30 Days 24.602 0.000 94.982 0.00 2000.00 
Jewels Past 30 Days 3.712 0.000 52.652 0.00 1999.00 
Gambling Past 30 Days 4.086 0.000 29.933 0.00 750.00 
Cigarettes Past 30 Days 30.475 0.000 117.606 0.00 2000.00 
Sports Past 30 Days 6.427 0.000 68.991 0.00 2000.00 
Entertainment Past 30 Days 22.289 0.000 144.110 0.00 5000.00 
Monthly Expenditure - Full Imputations 3739.703 1663.357 7118.124 211.47 135596.28 
Monthly Adult Goods Expenditure 144.948 40.000 342.801 0.00 5450.00 
Monthly Income - Full Imputations 4383.112 2117.599 7748.690 0.00 130000.00 
Observations 3528     
 
Table 3 details the 8 age and sex categories needed to estimate outlay-
equivalent ratios. Children made up 42% of the composition of a typical South African 
household in the pooled sample and adults made the remaining 58%. South African 
households, with children, had, on average, more women between the ages 15 and 55 
than it did men between the ages 15 and 55.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics – All Households, Age and Sex Categories 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Boys 0-4 0.069 0.118 0.00 0.67 
Girls 0-4 0.071 0.117 0.00 0.67 
Boys 5-14 0.145 0.158 0.00 0.75 
Girls 5-14 0.137 0.156 0.00 0.80 
Men 15-55 0.189 0.160 0.00 0.75 
Women 15-55 0.297 0.158 0.00 0.75 
Men 56-101 0.029 0.075 0.00 0.50 
Women 56-101 0.063 0.112 0.00 0.67 
Observations 3528    
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South Africa has an intricate education system, best defined by milestones. Table 
4 details the different levels of education achieved by South African household heads. In 
South Africa, completion of the 9th grade is the end of compulsory education. However, 
more than half of South African household heads either never attended school or 
stopped attending after the 7th grade.    
Table 4: Summary Statistics – All Households, Education 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No Schooling 0.238 0.426 0.00 1.00 
Grade 0 - 3 Completed 0.073 0.261 0.00 1.00 
Grade 4 - 7 Completed 0.249 0.432 0.00 1.00 
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.119 0.324 0.00 1.00 
Grade 10 - 11 Completed 0.132 0.338 0.00 1.00 
Grade 12 Completed 0.094 0.292 0.00 1.00 
Certificate or Diploma Std 10 completed or NTC 0.070 0.255 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor’s degree or Honour’s degree 0.018 0.133 0.00 1.00 
Masters or Doctorate 0.005 0.073 0.00 1.00 
Other 0.002 0.041 0.00 1.00 
Observations 3528    
 
In addition to the sample of South African households with children, I created 
two others, one with households headed exclusively by men and another with 
households headed exclusively by women. I made those two additional samples to 
examine whether household heads in South Africa favored children matching their sex. 
Tables 5-6 display summary statistics on the expenditure, household makeup, 
demographics and education characteristics for households headed by men or women. 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics – Male Headed Households  
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Expenditure      
Personal Care Past 30 Days 69.790 20.000 123.740 0.00 2000.00 
Alcohol Past 30 Days 41.626 0.000 121.417 0.00 2000.00 
Jewels Past 30 Days 6.111 0.000 73.547 0.00 1999.00 
Gambling Past 30 Days 7.475 0.000 42.790 0.00 750.00 
Cigarettes Past 30 Days 49.444 0.000 157.564 0.00 2000.00 
Sports Past 30 Days 10.130 0.000 85.345 0.00 2000.00 
Entertainment Past 30 Days 40.527 0.000 199.040 0.00 5000.00 
Monthly Expenditure - Full Imputations 5186.383 2139.372 9221.544 237.34 135596.28 
Monthly Adult Goods Expenditure 225.104 76.000 448.042 0.00 5450.00 
Monthly Income - Full Imputations 6122.607 2861.879 9691.132 0.00 102033.33 
Age and Sex Classes      
Boys 0-4 0.070 0.000 0.115 0.00 0.60 
Girls 0-4 0.067 0.000 0.110 0.00 0.50 
Boys 5-14 0.134 0.125 0.147 0.00 0.67 
Girls 5-14 0.123 0.077 0.142 0.00 0.60 
Men 15-55 0.250 0.250 0.143 0.00 0.75 
Women 15-55 0.268 0.250 0.130 0.00 0.71 
Men 56-98 0.055 0.000 0.096 0.00 0.50 
Women 56-98 0.033 0.000 0.074 0.00 0.40 
Demographics      
African 0.717 1.000 0.451 0.00 1.00 
Coloured 0.184 0.000 0.387 0.00 1.00 
Asian/Indian 0.025 0.000 0.157 0.00 1.00 
White 0.074 0.000 0.262 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.723 1.000 0.448 0.00 1.00 
Living with Partner 0.172 0.000 0.378 0.00 1.00 
Widow/Widower 0.038 0.000 0.191 0.00 1.00 
Divorced/Seperated 0.011 0.000 0.102 0.00 1.00 
Never Married 0.056 0.000 0.230 0.00 1.00 
Urban Formal 0.470 0.000 0.499 0.00 1.00 
Tribal Authority Areas 0.342 0.000 0.475 0.00 1.00 
Urban Informal 0.059 0.000 0.235 0.00 1.00 
Rural Formal 0.129 0.000 0.335 0.00 1.00 
Age 48.085 46.000 14.321 18.00 98.00 
Number of household residents 5.341 5.000 2.355 2.00 23.00 
Education      
No Schooling 0.197 0.000 0.398 0.00 1.00 
Grade R/0 - 3 Completed 0.065 0.000 0.246 0.00 1.00 
Grade 4 - 7 Completed 0.238 0.000 0.426 0.00 1.00 
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.122 0.000 0.328 0.00 1.00 
Grade 10 - 11 Completed 0.124 0.000 0.329 0.00 1.00 
Grade 12 Completed 0.124 0.000 0.330 0.00 1.00 
Certificate or Diploma Std 10 completed or 
NTC 
0.091 0.000 0.288 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor’s degree or Honour’s degree 0.029 0.000 0.168 0.00 1.00 
Masters or Doctorate 0.010 0.000 0.099 0.00 1.00 
Other 0.002 0.000 0.043 0.00 1.00 
Observations 1618     
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Table 6: Summary Statistics – Female Headed Households 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Expenditure      
Personal Care Past 30 Days 39.436 0.000 76.348 0.00 1000.00 
Alcohol Past 30 Days 10.180 0.000 61.050 0.00 1400.00 
Jewels Past 30 Days 1.679 0.000 23.047 0.00 600.00 
Gambling Past 30 Days 1.216 0.000 9.299 0.00 200.00 
Cigarettes Past 30 Days 14.405 0.000 62.939 0.00 700.00 
Sports Past 30 Days 3.290 0.000 51.019 0.00 1800.00 
Entertainment Past 30 Days 6.839 0.000 65.511 0.00 1800.00 
Monthly Expenditure - Full Imputations 2514.191 1418.953 4278.507 211.47 83618.70 
Monthly Adult Goods Expenditure 77.045 18.000 192.398 0.00 2530.00 
Monthly Income - Full Imputations 2909.550 1699.866 5161.619 0.00 130000.00 
Age and Sex Classes      
Boys 0-4 0.069 0.000 0.120 0.00 0.67 
Girls 0-4 0.074 0.000 0.123 0.00 0.67 
Boys 5-14 0.154 0.143 0.167 0.00 0.75 
Girls 5-14 0.149 0.125 0.166 0.00 0.80 
Men 15-55 0.137 0.111 0.154 0.00 0.67 
Women 15-55 0.321 0.333 0.175 0.00 0.75 
Men 56-101 0.008 0.000 0.039 0.00 0.33 
Women 56-101 0.089 0.000 0.131 0.00 0.67 
Demographics      
African 0.879 1.000 0.327 0.00 1.00 
Coloured 0.103 0.000 0.304 0.00 1.00 
Asian/Indian 0.006 0.000 0.079 0.00 1.00 
White 0.013 0.000 0.111 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.181 0.000 0.385 0.00 1.00 
Living with Partner 0.042 0.000 0.200 0.00 1.00 
Widow/Widower 0.370 0.000 0.483 0.00 1.00 
Divorced/Seperated 0.068 0.000 0.252 0.00 1.00 
Never Married 0.339 0.000 0.474 0.00 1.00 
Urban Formal 0.363 0.000 0.481 0.00 1.00 
Tribal Authority Areas 0.506 1.000 0.500 0.00 1.00 
Urban Informal 0.068 0.000 0.251 0.00 1.00 
Rural Formal 0.063 0.000 0.244 0.00 1.00 
Age 50.854 50.000 16.075 15.00 101.00 
Number of household residents 5.105 5.000 2.539 2.00 25.00 
Education      
No Schooling 0.274 0.000 0.446 0.00 1.00 
Grade R/0 - 3 Completed 0.081 0.000 0.272 0.00 1.00 
Grade 4 - 7 Completed 0.258 0.000 0.437 0.00 1.00 
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.117 0.000 0.321 0.00 1.00 
Grade 10 - 11 Completed 0.139 0.000 0.346 0.00 1.00 
Grade 12 Completed 0.068 0.000 0.252 0.00 1.00 
Certificate or Diploma Std 10 completed or 
NTC 
0.052 0.000 0.222 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor’s degree or Honour’s degree 0.009 0.000 0.094 0.00 1.00 
Masters or Doctorate 0.002 0.000 0.040 0.00 1.00 
Other 0.002 0.000 0.040 0.00 1.00 
Observations 1910     
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Relative to a median female headed household, a median male headed 
household had a significantly higher income and allocated slightly more of their budget, 
2.66%, towards adult goods than the 1.06% that the median female headed household 
spent on adult goods. In addition, female heads were married less often and widowed 
more often than male heads. Female heads also had lower levels of educational 
attainments than male heads did. Overall, female headed households had less financial 
and social resources at their disposal to run households as large those in the sample of 
male headed households.  
The same kind of extreme standard deviations and low median values, relative to 
the mean, seen in the sample of all South African households’ income and expenditure 
values repeat for the sample of households headed exclusively by men and the sample 
of households headed exclusively by women. However, in the case of male headed 
households, median personal care expenditure was slightly more in line with the mean 
than expenditure on any other adult good.   
To control for the severe income and wealth inequality in South Africa I also 
created samples for poor households, headed by men or women and rich households, 
headed by men or women. Poor households accounted for the bottom 90% of income 
earners and rich households, the top 10%. This breakdown is sound, when considering 
the research by Orthofer (2016), which found that the top 10% of South Africans owned 
90-95% of the wealth and 50-55% of the labor income in South Africa. Tables 7-10 
provide summary statistics on the demographic, household makeup, expenditure and 
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education characteristics for poor households, headed by men or women and rich 
households, headed by men or women.   
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Table 7: Summary Statistics – Poor Female Headed Households 
 Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Expenditure      
Personal Care Past 30 Days 34.349 0.000 65.807 0.00 800.00 
Alcohol Past 30 Days 7.827 0.000 39.851 0.00 700.00 
Jewels Past 30 Days 1.460 0.000 22.404 0.00 600.00 
Gambling Past 30 Days 1.123 0.000 9.099 0.00 200.00 
Cigarettes Past 30 Days 10.996 0.000 48.742 0.00 700.00 
Sports Past 30 Days 1.466 0.000 25.570 0.00 1000.00 
Entertainment Past 30 Days 3.543 0.000 55.533 0.00 1800.00 
Monthly Expenditure - Full Imputations 1968.354 1360.738 2442.037 211.47 55599.70 
Monthly Adult Goods Expenditure 60.764 15.000 135.378 0.00 2100.00 
Monthly Income - Full Imputations 2136.359 1617.498 1693.618 0.00 9132.83 
Age and Sex Classes      
Boys 0-4 0.071 0.000 0.122 0.00 0.67 
Girls 0-4 0.075 0.000 0.124 0.00 0.67 
Boys 5-14 0.153 0.143 0.166 0.00 0.75 
Girls 5-14 0.150 0.125 0.166 0.00 0.80 
Boys 15-55 0.135 0.100 0.153 0.00 0.67 
Women 15-55 0.319 0.333 0.176 0.00 0.75 
Men 56-101 0.008 0.000 0.039 0.00 0.33 
Women 56-101 0.091 0.000 0.132 0.00 0.67 
Demographics      
African 0.892 1.000 0.311 0.00 1.00 
Coloured 0.102 0.000 0.302 0.00 1.00 
Asian/Indian 0.004 0.000 0.062 0.00 1.00 
White 0.003 0.000 0.052 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.177 0.000 0.382 0.00 1.00 
Living with Partner 0.043 0.000 0.204 0.00 1.00 
Widow/Widower 0.370 0.000 0.483 0.00 1.00 
Divorced/Seperated 0.063 0.000 0.242 0.00 1.00 
Never Married 0.346 0.000 0.476 0.00 1.00 
Urban Formal 0.346 0.000 0.476 0.00 1.00 
Tribal Authority Areas 0.520 1.000 0.500 0.00 1.00 
Urban Informal 0.069 0.000 0.254 0.00 1.00 
Rural Formal 0.065 0.000 0.246 0.00 1.00 
Age 50.989 50.000 16.164 15.00 101.00 
Number of household residents 5.084 5.000 2.492 2.00 23.00 
Education      
No Schooling 0.284 0.000 0.451 0.00 1.00 
Grade R/0 - 3 Completed 0.083 0.000 0.276 0.00 1.00 
Grade 4 - 7 Completed 0.266 0.000 0.442 0.00 1.00 
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.119 0.000 0.324 0.00 1.00 
Grade 10 - 11 Completed 0.140 0.000 0.347 0.00 1.00 
Grade 12 Completed 0.060 0.000 0.238 0.00 1.00 
Certificate or Diploma Std 10 completed or NTC 0.041 0.000 0.199 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor’s degree or Honour’s degree 0.004 0.000 0.066 0.00 1.00 
Masters or Doctorate 0.001 0.000 0.023 0.00 1.00 
Other 0.002 0.000 0.041 0.00 1.00 
Observations 1820     
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Table 8: Summary Statistics – Poor Male Headed Households 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expenditure      
Personal Care Past 30 Days 46.693 10.000 83.014 0.00 1000.00 
Alcohol Past 30 Days 25.518 0.000 68.491 0.00 1000.00 
Jewels Past 30 Days 2.934 0.000 58.229 0.00 1999.00 
Gambling Past 30 Days 5.451 0.000 37.050 0.00 750.00 
Cigarettes Past 30 Days 32.269 0.000 103.798 0.00 2000.00 
Sports Past 30 Days 2.658 0.000 34.656 0.00 1000.00 
Entertainment Past 30 Days 13.338 0.000 127.261 0.00 4000.00 
Monthly Expenditure - Full Imputations 2697.856 1741.136 3198.360 237.34 63284.98 
Monthly Adult Goods Expenditure 128.861 50.000 240.356 0.00 4000.00 
Monthly Income - Full Imputations 2972.423 2391.036 2052.456 0.00 9323.42 
Age and Sex Classes      
Boys 0-4 0.071 0.000 0.115 0.00 0.60 
Girls 0-4 0.069 0.000 0.111 0.00 0.50 
Boys 5-14 0.136 0.125 0.147 0.00 0.67 
Girls 5-14 0.121 0.077 0.139 0.00 0.60 
Men 15-55 0.243 0.250 0.146 0.00 0.75 
Women 15-55 0.264 0.250 0.132 0.00 0.67 
Men 56-98 0.060 0.000 0.098 0.00 0.50 
Women 56-98 0.035 0.000 0.075 0.00 0.33 
Demographics      
African 0.788 1.000 0.409 0.00 1.00 
Coloured 0.184 0.000 0.388 0.00 1.00 
Asian/Indian 0.011 0.000 0.105 0.00 1.00 
White 0.016 0.000 0.126 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.688 1.000 0.463 0.00 1.00 
Living with Partner 0.198 0.000 0.398 0.00 1.00 
Widow/Widower 0.040 0.000 0.196 0.00 1.00 
Divorced/Seperated 0.008 0.000 0.090 0.00 1.00 
Never Married 0.066 0.000 0.249 0.00 1.00 
Urban Formal 0.397 0.000 0.489 0.00 1.00 
Tribal Authority Areas 0.397 0.000 0.490 0.00 1.00 
Urban Informal 0.066 0.000 0.249 0.00 1.00 
Rural Formal 0.139 0.000 0.346 0.00 1.00 
Age 48.863 47.000 14.851 18.00 98.00 
Number of household residents 5.445 5.000 2.393 2.00 23.00 
Education      
No Schooling 0.233 0.000 0.423 0.00 1.00 
Grade R/0 - 3 Completed 0.076 0.000 0.265 0.00 1.00 
Grade 4 - 7 Completed 0.271 0.000 0.445 0.00 1.00 
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.133 0.000 0.340 0.00 1.00 
Grade 10 - 11 Completed 0.130 0.000 0.336 0.00 1.00 
Grade 12 Completed 0.097 0.000 0.297 0.00 1.00 
Certificate or Diploma Std 10 completed or NTC 0.052 0.000 0.221 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor’s degree or Honour’s degree 0.005 0.000 0.072 0.00 1.00 
Masters or Doctorate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 
Other 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.00 1.00 
Observations 1356     
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Table 9: Summary Statistics – Rich Female Headed Households 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expenditure      
Personal Care Past 30 Days 142.289 100.000 159.041 0.00 1000.00 
Alcohol Past 30 Days 57.767 0.000 212.332 0.00 1400.00 
Jewels Past 30 Days 6.111 0.000 33.375 0.00 200.00 
Gambling Past 30 Days 3.100 0.000 12.594 0.00 84.00 
Cigarettes Past 30 Days 83.344 0.000 177.108 0.00 700.00 
Sports Past 30 Days 40.167 0.000 202.549 0.00 1800.00 
Entertainment Past 30 Days 73.500 0.000 155.916 0.00 600.00 
Monthly Expenditure - Full Imputations 13552.235 10238.999 11893.740 1163.00 83618.70 
Monthly Adult Goods Expenditure 406.278 215.000 551.710 0.00 2530.00 
Monthly Income - Full Imputations 18545.184 13749.083 15918.348 9333.33 130000.00 
Age and Sex Classes      
Boys 0-4 0.033 0.000 0.083 0.00 0.50 
Girls 0-4 0.057 0.000 0.100 0.00 0.33 
Boys 5-14 0.174 0.134 0.185 0.00 0.75 
Girls 5-14 0.132 0.076 0.162 0.00 0.75 
Men 15-55 0.184 0.183 0.172 0.00 0.50 
Women 15-55 0.360 0.333 0.161 0.00 0.75 
Men 56-84 0.010 0.000 0.044 0.00 0.33 
Women 56-84 0.050 0.000 0.094 0.00 0.50 
Demographics      
African 0.611 1.000 0.490 0.00 1.00 
Coloured 0.122 0.000 0.329 0.00 1.00 
Asian/Indian 0.056 0.000 0.230 0.00 1.00 
White 0.211 0.000 0.410 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.244 0.000 0.432 0.00 1.00 
Living with Partner 0.011 0.000 0.105 0.00 1.00 
Widow/Widower 0.367 0.000 0.485 0.00 1.00 
Divorced/Seperated 0.178 0.000 0.384 0.00 1.00 
Never Married 0.200 0.000 0.402 0.00 1.00 
Urban Formal 0.700 1.000 0.461 0.00 1.00 
Tribal Authority Areas 0.233 0.000 0.425 0.00 1.00 
Urban Informal 0.033 0.000 0.181 0.00 1.00 
Rural Formal 0.033 0.000 0.181 0.00 1.00 
Age 48.133 45.500 13.953 23.00 84.00 
Number of household residents 5.533 5.000 3.339 2.00 25.00 
Education      
No Schooling 0.078 0.000 0.269 0.00 1.00 
Grade R/0 - 3 Completed 0.033 0.000 0.181 0.00 1.00 
Grade 4 - 7 Completed 0.078 0.000 0.269 0.00 1.00 
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.067 0.000 0.251 0.00 1.00 
Grade 10 - 11 Completed 0.122 0.000 0.329 0.00 1.00 
Grade 12 Completed 0.222 0.000 0.418 0.00 1.00 
Certificate or Diploma Std 10 completed 
or NTC 
0.267 0.000 0.445 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor’s degree or Honour’s degree 0.100 0.000 0.302 0.00 1.00 
Masters or Doctorate 0.022 0.000 0.148 0.00 1.00 
Other 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 
Observations 90     
 31 
Table 10: Summary Statistics – Rich Male Headed Households 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expenditure      
Personal Care Past 30 Days 189.332 150.000 204.862 0.00 2000.00 
Alcohol Past 30 Days 124.996 0.000 242.185 0.00 2000.00 
Jewels Past 30 Days 22.553 0.000 124.840 0.00 1500.00 
Gambling Past 30 Days 17.947 0.000 63.919 0.00 500.00 
Cigarettes Past 30 Days 138.336 0.000 297.340 0.00 1800.00 
Sports Past 30 Days 48.805 0.000 192.611 0.00 2000.00 
Entertainment Past 30 Days 181.248 0.000 371.005 0.00 5000.00 
Monthly Expenditure - Full Imputations 18065.938 14820.685 16584.270 2115.00 135596.28 
Monthly Adult Goods Expenditure 723.218 500.000 804.091 0.00 5450.00 
Monthly Income - Full Imputations 22426.613 16808.770 15543.284 9373.09 102033.33 
Age and Sex Classes      
Boys 0-4 0.062 0.000 0.114 0.00 0.50 
Girls 0-4 0.056 0.000 0.104 0.00 0.40 
Boys 5-14 0.124 0.000 0.143 0.00 0.60 
Girls 5-14 0.134 0.077 0.152 0.00 0.60 
Men 15-55 0.285 0.250 0.123 0.00 0.67 
Women 15-55 0.290 0.250 0.117 0.00 0.71 
Men 56-82 0.027 0.000 0.074 0.00 0.40 
Women 56-82 0.022 0.000 0.069 0.00 0.40 
Demographics      
African 0.347 0.000 0.477 0.00 1.00 
Coloured 0.179 0.000 0.384 0.00 1.00 
Asian/Indian 0.099 0.000 0.300 0.00 1.00 
White 0.374 0.000 0.485 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.905 1.000 0.294 0.00 1.00 
Living with Partner 0.042 0.000 0.201 0.00 1.00 
Widow/Widower 0.027 0.000 0.162 0.00 1.00 
Divorced/Seperated 0.023 0.000 0.150 0.00 1.00 
Never Married 0.004 0.000 0.062 0.00 1.00 
Urban Formal 0.851 1.000 0.357 0.00 1.00 
Tribal Authority Areas 0.057 0.000 0.233 0.00 1.00 
Urban Informal 0.019 0.000 0.137 0.00 1.00 
Rural Formal 0.073 0.000 0.260 0.00 1.00 
Age 44.057 42.000 10.301 26.00 82.00 
Number of household residents 4.805 4.000 2.073 2.00 17.00 
Education      
No Schooling 0.008 0.000 0.087 0.00 1.00 
Grade R/0 - 3 Completed 0.008 0.000 0.087 0.00 1.00 
Grade 4 - 7 Completed 0.065 0.000 0.247 0.00 1.00 
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.065 0.000 0.247 0.00 1.00 
Grade 10 - 11 Completed 0.092 0.000 0.289 0.00 1.00 
Grade 12 Completed 0.263 0.000 0.441 0.00 1.00 
Certificate or Diploma Std 10 completed 
or NTC 
0.298 0.000 0.458 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor’s degree or Honour’s degree 0.153 0.000 0.360 0.00 1.00 
Masters or Doctorate 0.061 0.000 0.240 0.00 1.00 
Other 0.004 0.000 0.062 0.00 1.00 
Observations 262     
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The differences observed in education, marital status, income and expenditure 
between male and female headed households repeat as a pattern in the samples 
separated by rich and poor incomes. Poor and rich male headed households still had 
more financial and social resources than their counterpart female headed households 
did. As expected, rich households had significantly more financial and social resources to 
apportion amongst their residents than poor households did. In addition, a median poor 
household allocated a smaller share of their budget, 1.56%, towards adult goods 
expenditure than a median rich household did, at 2.74%.  
Even with separating the samples of male and female headed households by 
income, the extreme standard deviations and low median values reoccur. Apart from 
personal care spending, even amongst the top 10% of South African households, few of 
them spent much of anything on adult goods. It appears from the data that either a 
minority of South African households, poor and rich, did the most of the spending on 
adult goods, and/or, despite the imputations, the expenditure data in the NIDS still has 
some quality issues.  
5 Methods 
 
The 1st wave of the NIDS does not capture information directly on the level of 
expenditure South African households allocated to their children. Because of this, an 
indirect approach is needed to examine whether evidence exists to support my 
hypothesis that South African households discriminated against their girl children 
and/or that female headed households favored their girl children over their boy 
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children. In Deaton (1989), Angus Deaton developed an inferential method for use in 
determining whether households discriminated against their girl children in favor of 
their boy children.   
Deaton’s (1989) outlay-equivalence method works by simulating an additional 
household member and observing the impact they have on a household’s demand for 
an adult good, based on the age and gender of that additional household member. 
Equation 1 details the ratio which captures the impact from a person of type r on the 
expenditure good of i.  
𝜋𝑖𝑟 =
𝛿(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)/𝛿 ∗ 𝑛𝑟
𝛿(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)/𝛿 ∗ 𝑥
∗  
𝑛
𝑥
 (1) 
Specifically, an outlay-equivalent ratio is defined in this circumstance as the 
impact of an additional person of type r on the household demand for good i. The 
impact from an additional person of type r is accounted by equation (2): 
(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)/𝛿 ∗ 𝑛𝑟  (2)
The household’s income effect on good i is captured by their marginal propensity to 
spend on good i, shown here in equation (3): 
(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)/𝛿 ∗ 𝑥 (3) 
The size of a household and its total level of expenditure are captured here in equation 
(4):  
𝑛
𝑥
 (4) 
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However, before generating an outlay-equivalent ratio, several steps are required.  
Deaton (1989) observed the simulated impact an additional child had on Thai 
and Ivorian households’ demand for adult clothing, adult fabric, adult shoes, alcohol, 
tobacco, meals out and entertainment. Deaton (1989) defined this list as a class of 
demographically separate adult goods, or goods that only adults but not children would 
consume. Pure adult goods are used because it is simpler to observe the income effect 
an additional child has on a household’s expenditure for a good that no child would 
consume. To generate a list of qualified adult goods, Deaton (1989) fashioned a test, 
equation (5), that would determine, based on available data, whether a good was not 
consumed by children. 
𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 = 𝑏0𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑖𝑥𝐺 + ∑𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖𝑧 + 𝑢𝑖  (5) 
 
pi is the price of adult good i and qi is the quantity of adult good i, together they 
are symbolic of a household’s total expenditure on adult good i. XG is a household’s total 
expenditure on all qualified adult goods, including good i. Nj is sum of all household 
residents who belong to previously defined age/sex classes, including children and 
adults. Z is a vector of control variables, containing information on a respondent’s 
demographics and characteristics. Ui is an error term, capturing every demographic and 
characteristic variable not accounted for the vector of control variables, z. Under this 
test, an adult good qualifies as one if the children of the household have no significant 
impact on a household’s demand for that good. Once a list of suitable adult goods is 
created, Engel curves for each qualified good must be generated. 
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Generally, Engel curves relate a household’s income with the quantity of a 
purchased good. Deaton (1989) makes uses of an Engel curve specification developed by 
Working (1943), which supposes a linear relationship between the share of expenditure 
a household spends on each good and the log of that household’s total expenditure:   
𝑤𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑥
𝑛
) + 𝜂𝑖ln (𝑛) + ∑∗
𝐽−1
𝑗=1
𝛾𝑖𝑗 (
𝑛𝑗
𝑛
) + 𝛿𝑖𝑧 + 𝑢𝑖  (6) 
The budget share a household allocates to the purchase of good i is modeled by 
wi.  The parameter Bi is the natural log of x, total household expenditure divided by n, 
the total number of household residents. The natural log of n allows for circumstances 
where expenditure changes relative to the size of a household even though the model 
has controlled for household structure and household per capita expenditure. Yij 
captures the demographic composition of the household through nj, the number of 
household residents in age/sex class j and n. The parameter δ stores additional 
information through z, a vector of control variables for household characteristics like 
region, education, race, age and marital status. Ui is an error term, collecting any 
circumstances not accounted for in the model. The parameters estimated in equation 
(6) can then be used to calculate an outlay-equivalent ratio, shown in equation (7): 
𝜋𝑖𝑟 =  
(𝑛𝑖 − 𝐵𝑖) + 𝛾𝑖𝑟 − ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗(
𝐽
𝑗=1 𝑛𝑗/𝑛)
𝐵𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖
 (7) 
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The value of πir is interpreted as the impact of an additional person of type r on 
the demand for good i, equal to a percentage increase or decrease in expenditure on 
good i per each member of that household.   
6 Results 
 
Table 11 displays results from a plausibility test that I ran for a series of goods, 
from the sample of all South African households, which I inferred would qualify as adult 
goods. Results in Table 11, confirm for most goods that children did not have a 
statistically significant impact on their household’s consumption of those goods. 
However, girls and boys aged 0-4 had a statistically significant impact on the 
consumption of gambling and entertainment, respectively, disqualifying them as adult 
goods.  
Tables 12 and 13 provide results from the same plausibility test on the same set 
of goods, but for the samples of male and female headed households. The results from 
the plausibility test on the sample of male headed households indicate that every good, 
except entertainment, qualified as an adult good. In the sample of female headed 
households, Deaton’s (1989) adult goods test indicate that except for alcohol, every 
good passed, qualifying them as adult goods. 
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Table 11: Results – Adult Goods Test, All Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Alcohol  Personal 
Care  
Jewels  Gambling  Cigarettes  Sports  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 2.95 1.34 0.84 -0.98 4.01 -0.33 -7.83* 
 (2.46) (3.21) (1.28) (0.72) (4.01) (1.34) (3.89) 
        
Girls 0-4 -2.72 2.06 2.53 2.86* 0.77 0.16 -5.67 
 (2.09) (3.54) (2.14) (1.39) (4.62) (2.17) (4.78) 
        
Boys 5-14 0.68 -0.37 0.99 -0.15 5.37 1.81 -8.34 
 (2.30) (3.51) (1.94) (0.67) (5.15) (1.13) (4.33) 
        
Girls 5-14 -3.20 0.10 0.39 -0.42 -0.63 -0.57 4.33 
 (1.86) (2.68) (1.26) (0.69) (3.19) (1.46) (4.91) 
        
Men 15-55 2.54 1.59 -1.85 -0.43 5.66 -1.29 -6.23 
 (1.51) (3.60) (1.13) (0.55) (3.21) (0.89) (3.97) 
        
Women 15-55 -0.81 8.23* -1.57 0.24 -7.71* -1.39 3.00 
 (1.63) (3.59) (1.52) (0.55) (3.18) (1.14) (4.13) 
        
Men 56-101 1.58 11.90 -4.70 -0.94 5.54 5.63 -19.01 
 (6.66) (14.41) (2.58) (2.18) (14.24) (4.34) (9.92) 
        
Women 56-101 -0.81 2.72 -3.27 5.51* -0.98 -2.88 -0.28 
 (5.04) (10.92) (2.60) (2.17) (11.19) (3.41) (9.16) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 12: Results – Adult Goods Test, Male Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Alcohol  Personal Care  Jewels  Gambling  Cigarettes  Sports  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 6.08 0.68 0.61 -2.26 8.95 -0.83 -13.24 
 (4.78) (6.06) (2.44) (1.42) (7.87) (2.61) (7.65) 
        
Girls 0-4 -7.52 2.38 6.84 4.87 3.34 -0.07 -9.85 
 (4.58) (7.36) (4.44) (2.85) (10.56) (4.73) (10.24) 
        
Boys 5-14 1.84 -3.78 3.32 0.26 12.56 3.38 -17.58* 
 (4.55) (6.05) (3.89) (1.42) (10.62) (2.44) (8.57) 
        
Girls 5-14 -4.43 -2.72 2.17 -1.46 -2.22 -0.49 9.15 
 (3.96) (4.88) (2.42) (1.53) (6.91) (2.40) (10.46) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 13: Results – Adult Goods Test, Female Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Alcohol  Personal Care  Jewels  Gambling  Cigarettes  Sports  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 -0.82 3.44 -0.45 0.09 -0.26 -0.42 -1.58 
 (1.27) (2.70) (0.82) (0.40) (2.97) (0.61) (1.97) 
        
Girls 0-4 1.21 2.61 -0.96 1.05 -2.01 -0.03 -1.87 
 (1.42) (3.16) (1.12) (0.61) (2.07) (1.04) (2.69) 
        
Boys 5-14 0.84 2.79 0.05 -0.00 -1.84 0.22 -2.04 
 (1.61) (2.65) (0.46) (0.37) (2.00) (0.79) (2.98) 
        
Girls 5-14 -2.40* 2.85 -1.70 0.34 -0.05 -0.89 1.84 
 (1.12) (2.00) (1.02) (0.36) (1.59) (1.85) (2.57) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Tables 14 contains a set of outlay-equivalent ratios for all South African 
households. The results in Table 15 are a test, determining whether there is a 
statistically significant difference between the coefficients for each age and sex class. A 
statistically insignificant difference in the coefficients suggests there is no evidence of 
discrimination. While it appears in Table 14, that households significantly reduced 
alcohol expenditure for 0-14 year old girls, the results in Table 15 suggest that no 
discrimination took place. There is no evidence, from this sample, to suggest that South 
African households discriminated against their girl children in favor of their boy children. 
Likewise, the results in Tables 16-19 suggest that male and female headed households 
did not have significant preferences for boys or girls. 
 39 
Table 14: Results – Outlay Equivalent Ratios, All Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Personal Care  Alcohol  Jewel  Sport  Cigarette  
Boys 0-4 0.23 -0.08 -0.47 -0.87 -0.65 
 (0.34) (0.34) (1.01) (0.83) (0.47) 
      
Girls 0-4 -0.12 -0.66* -0.70 -1.10 -0.43 
 (0.32) (0.31) (1.12) (0.72) (0.43) 
      
Boys 5-14 -0.33 -0.32 0.41 0.74 0.21 
 (0.23) (0.27) (1.25) (0.59) (0.50) 
      
Girls 5-14 -0.30 -0.50* -0.44 -0.68 -0.43 
 (0.23) (0.23) (1.23) (0.74) (0.34) 
      
Men 15-55 -0.33* 0.13 0.08 -0.67 0.89** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.86) (0.44) (0.28) 
      
Women 15-55 0.31 -0.04 -0.66 -0.16 -0.49 
 (0.19) (0.20) (1.28) (0.69) (0.33) 
      
Men 56-101 -0.47 -0.01 -2.33* 0.89 0.26 
 (0.40) (0.66) (0.99) (1.98) (1.08) 
      
Women 56-101 0.10 -0.48 -2.81 -0.79 -0.33 
 (0.35) (0.39) (2.08) (1.25) (0.65) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 15: Results – Differences, All Households 
 (1) 
 Alcohol  
Differences 0-4 0.58 
 (0.40) 
  
Differences 5-14 0.19 
 (0.24) 
  
Differences 15-55 0.17 
 (0.28) 
  
Differences 56-101 0.47 
 (0.71) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 16: Results – Outlay Equivalent Ratios, Female Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Gambling  Personal Care  Entertainment  Jewel  Sport  Cigarette  
Boys 0-4 -0.15 0.57 -1.13* -2.21 -1.60 -0.35 
 (0.41) (0.39) (0.52) (1.73) (0.92) (0.38) 
       
Girls 0-4 0.45 0.13 -0.78 -2.16 -0.66 -0.16 
 (0.45) (0.34) (0.46) (1.78) (1.04) (0.35) 
       
Boys 5-14 -0.32 -0.11 -0.60 -1.02 0.53 0.04 
 (0.39) (0.27) (0.47) (0.92) (0.52) (0.51) 
       
Girls 5-14 1.20 -0.12 0.32 -3.23 -0.42 -0.06 
 (1.47) (0.27) (0.72) (2.03) (1.22) (0.38) 
       
Men 15-55 0.83 -0.24 -0.60 0.51 -1.16* 0.58* 
 (0.73) (0.18) (0.58) (1.50) (0.52) (0.24) 
       
Women 15-55 -0.22 0.29 0.30 1.05 1.47 0.41 
 (0.39) (0.25) (0.75) (1.34) (1.33) (0.38) 
       
Men 56-101 -2.00 -1.35* -2.24* -1.20 -1.33 -0.27 
 (1.95) (0.59) (0.89) (2.37) (1.05) (0.77) 
       
Women 56-101 0.39 0.20 1.31 -1.37 3.13 0.14 
 (0.63) (0.43) (1.20) (3.10) (1.64) (0.41) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 17: Results – Differences, Female Headed Households 
 (1) 
 Entertainment  
Differences 0-4 -0.35 
 (0.28) 
  
Differences 5-14 -0.92 
 (0.96) 
  
Differences 15-55 -0.90 
 (1.31) 
  
Differences 56-101 -3.54* 
 (1.78) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 18: Results – Outlay Equivalent Ratios, Male Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Alcohol  Personal Care  Jewel  Gambling  Sport  Cigarette  
Boys 0-4 -0.05 -0.40 2.65 -1.95 -0.88 -0.32 
 (0.71) (0.56) (2.14) (1.25) (1.42) (0.99) 
       
Girls 0-4 -1.53* -0.81 1.65 0.92 -2.32* -0.56 
 (0.66) (0.58) (1.74) (1.67) (1.08) (0.92) 
       
Boys 5-14 -0.52 -0.98* 4.95 -0.78 0.62 1.19 
 (0.57) (0.43) (5.21) (1.01) (0.99) (1.14) 
       
Girls 5-14 -1.03* -0.72 4.21 -1.58 -0.93 -0.63 
 (0.49) (0.39) (2.71) (1.07) (1.14) (0.83) 
       
Men 15-55 -0.17 -0.17 -1.39 -1.41* -0.34 0.94 
 (0.47) (0.35) (1.22) (0.57) (1.01) (0.80) 
       
Women 15-55 0.15 0.24 -2.96 -0.74 -0.90 -1.44 
 (0.43) (0.30) (1.60) (0.65) (0.85) (0.83) 
       
Men 56-98 -1.46 0.09 -5.91 -2.14 0.82 -2.88 
 (1.33) (0.91) (3.67) (1.40) (3.16) (1.79) 
       
Women 56-98 0.48 0.16 -3.94 2.91 -2.66 1.97 
 (0.85) (0.66) (2.05) (2.08) (2.18) (2.31) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 19: Results – Differences, Male Headed Households  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Alcohol  Personal Care  Sport  
Differences 0-4 1.48 0.40 1.44 
 (0.76) (0.67) (0.82) 
    
Differences 5-14 0.52 -0.26 1.55 
 (0.57) (0.44) (1.44) 
    
Differences 15-55 -0.32 -0.41 0.55 
 (0.65) (0.47) (1.60) 
    
Differences 56-98 -1.94 -0.07 3.49 
 (1.54) (1.15) (4.14) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Initial results did not find any evidence to suggest that boys or girls, in South 
Africa, faced discrimination at the household level. However, research by Gibson and 
Rozelle (2004) and Arndt et. al. (2006) suggests that a sample stratified by income may 
yield different results, suggesting that South African household heads prefer children 
who matching their sex.  
Tables 20-23 contain the results from an adult goods test on a series of goods 
from the samples of poor and rich female and poor and rich male headed households. In 
the sample of poor male headed households, every good except for alcohol qualified as 
an adult good. For rich female and male headed households, cigarettes and 
entertainment, respectively, did not qualify as adult goods. 
Table 20: Results – Adult Goods Test, Poor Female Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Alcohol  Personal 
Care  
Jewels  Gambling  Cigarettes  Sports  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 -1.40 2.39 -0.89 -0.01 2.74 -0.31 -2.52 
 (1.17) (2.65) (0.93) (0.31) (2.55) (0.33) (2.10) 
        
Girls 0-4 -0.19 3.02 -1.34 0.84 -1.30 0.71 -1.74 
 (1.01) (3.24) (1.28) (0.59) (1.18) (0.82) (2.69) 
        
Boys 5-14 0.09 2.84 -0.03 0.22 -0.52 0.36 -2.96 
 (0.83) (2.40) (0.50) (0.34) (1.41) (0.41) (2.37) 
        
Girls 5-14 -1.37 2.34 -1.78 0.48 -1.27 -0.29 1.88 
 (0.70) (1.80) (1.12) (0.36) (0.97) (0.44) (2.24) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 21: Results – Adult Goods Test, Poor Male Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Alcohol  Personal 
Care  
Jewels  Gambling  Cigarettes  Sports  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 8.84* -1.64 -0.03 -2.08 1.98 -0.65 -6.42 
 (3.46) (4.12) (1.23) (1.29) (3.52) (1.21) (5.85) 
        
Girls 0-4 -3.41 5.24 -0.23 1.32 0.48 -1.46 -1.94 
 (3.00) (4.93) (1.45) (1.62) (3.81) (0.96) (5.72) 
        
Boys 5-14 0.06 0.82 -0.61 0.09 3.33 -0.14 -3.55 
 (3.00) (4.67) (0.73) (0.94) (5.51) (0.86) (5.92) 
        
Girls 5-14 -3.12 -6.85 0.02 -1.26 -2.85 -1.29 15.35 
 (2.62) (4.73) (0.95) (1.18) (4.07) (0.93) (10.14) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 22: Results – Adult Goods Test, Rich Female Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Alcohol  Personal Care  Jewels  Gambling  Cigarettes  Sports  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 -29.71 33.46 2.65 0.58 -18.95 2.75 9.22 
 (18.82) (21.70) (3.04) (3.64) (23.09) (20.84) (24.23) 
        
Girls 0-4 7.96 -5.72 -1.63 4.34 21.14 -13.38 -12.71 
 (15.11) (15.75) (1.38) (2.39) (14.21) (13.96) (16.46) 
        
Boys 5-14 6.67 4.44 2.75 -3.43 -49.55** 3.71 35.41 
 (22.89) (19.26) (3.73) (1.91) (17.01) (13.18) (21.56) 
        
Girls 5-14 -25.17 23.99 -3.41 -3.87 38.24 -47.61 17.83 
 (18.15) (24.69) (2.78) (2.07) (19.79) (50.02) (27.68) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 23: Results – Adults Goods Test, Rich Male Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Alcohol  Personal Care  Jewels  Gambling  Cigarettes  Sports  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 -6.85 6.15 4.32 -2.40 44.48 6.06 -51.76 
 (18.65) (20.41) (14.23) (4.15) (40.71) (13.25) (28.55) 
        
Girls 0-4 -43.17 5.99 40.21 19.14 26.02 -0.60 -47.59 
 (24.59) (29.00) (23.85) (12.02) (53.84) (22.66) (54.60) 
        
Boys 5-14 2.14 -3.00 22.44 0.29 57.46 11.78 -91.11* 
 (19.08) (21.42) (15.62) (5.70) (43.96) (10.50) (35.85) 
        
Girls 5-14 -15.46 8.89 14.82 -0.56 22.47 5.84 -36.00 
 (16.76) (17.03) (12.96) (5.32) (32.79) (10.03) (28.13) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Tables 24, 26, 28 and 30 contain a series of outlay-equivalent ratios for the 
samples of poor female and male headed households and rich female and male headed 
households. There was no evidence to suggest that rich households and poor male 
headed households had significant preferences for boys or girls. However, from the 
results in Tables 24 and 25, there is statistically significant evidence to suggest that poor 
female headed households did reduce their expenditure on entertainment more so for 
0-4 year old boys than they did for 0-4 year old girls, suggesting a preference for boys 
over girls.
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Table 24: Results – Outlay Equivalent Ratios, Poor Female Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Alcohol  Gambling  Personal Care  Entertainment  Jewel  Sport  Cigarette  
Boys 0-4 -0.35 -0.17 0.51 -1.26* -2.40 -0.78* -0.12 
 (0.26) (0.40) (0.41) (0.52) (1.62) (0.39) (0.39) 
        
Girls 0-4 -0.46 0.25 0.08 -0.68 -2.22 0.22 -0.12 
 (0.26) (0.42) (0.35) (0.48) (1.63) (0.56) (0.35) 
        
Boys 5-14 -0.34 -0.22 -0.08 -0.78 -1.05 0.45 0.23 
 (0.18) (0.38) (0.27) (0.46) (0.93) (0.42) (0.56) 
        
Girls 5-14 -0.48* 1.38 -0.14 0.25 -3.17 0.22 0.04 
 (0.19) (1.61) (0.28) (0.73) (1.82) (0.45) (0.42) 
        
Men 15-55 -0.11 0.84 -0.17 -0.50 0.38 -0.81* 0.61* 
 (0.17) (0.76) (0.19) (0.64) (1.42) (0.39) (0.26) 
        
Women 15-55 0.09 -0.24 0.29 0.27 1.16 0.41 0.45 
 (0.22) (0.44) (0.27) (0.82) (1.39) (0.64) (0.40) 
        
Men 56-101 2.08 -1.87 -1.39* -1.63* -0.95 -1.05* -0.18 
 (1.52) (2.13) (0.59) (0.77) (2.52) (0.53) (0.80) 
        
Women 56-101 -0.31 0.27 0.23 1.55 -1.23 1.70 -0.17 
 (0.29) (0.75) (0.46) (1.29) (3.08) (1.12) (0.36) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 25: Results – Differences, Poor Female Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Alcohol  Entertainment  Sport  
Differences 0-4 0.11 -0.58* -1.00 
 (0.30) (0.27) (0.58) 
    
Differences 5-14 0.14 -1.03 0.24 
 (0.17) (0.98) (0.35) 
    
Differences 15-55 -0.20 -0.77 -1.22 
 (0.29) (1.44) (0.89) 
    
Differences 56-101 2.39 -3.18 -2.75 
 (1.64) (1.69) (1.45) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 26: Results – Outlay Equivalent Ratios, Poor Male Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Personal Care  Jewel  Gambling  Sport  Cigarette  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 -0.34 0.70 -1.89 -1.30 -0.43 0.32 
 (0.67) (1.24) (1.20) (1.23) (0.76) (0.52) 
       
Girls 0-4 -0.85 -0.57 0.72 -2.34* -0.64 -0.03 
 (0.66) (1.27) (1.64) (1.03) (0.75) (0.72) 
       
Boys 5-14 -1.17* -0.68 -0.82 -0.92 0.36 -0.86* 
 (0.50) (1.07) (0.91) (0.92) (0.74) (0.42) 
       
Girls 5-14 -0.87 1.64 -1.66 -0.85 -1.11 0.87 
 (0.44) (2.14) (1.01) (0.65) (0.62) (0.92) 
       
Men 15-55 -0.21 -0.84 -1.08* 0.38 0.08 1.05 
 (0.37) (0.77) (0.42) (1.24) (0.55) (0.73) 
       
Women 15-55 0.07 -0.60 -0.29 -0.76 -1.29* 0.50 
 (0.30) (0.56) (0.49) (0.94) (0.63) (0.63) 
       
Men 56-98 -0.43 -2.48 -3.42** 2.41 -2.58 0.82 
 (1.03) (2.30) (1.24) (2.40) (1.38) (0.96) 
       
Women 56-98 0.18 -1.22 0.38 -0.59 2.00 -1.78* 
 (0.75) (1.18) (1.18) (2.30) (1.53) (0.70) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 27: Results – Differences, Poor Male Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Personal Care  Sport  Entertainment  
Differences 0-4 0.51 1.04 0.35 
 (0.75) (0.80) (0.85) 
    
Differences 5-14 -0.30 -0.06 -1.73 
 (0.55) (0.97) (1.16) 
    
Differences 15-55 -0.29 1.14 0.55 
 (0.49) (1.92) (0.74) 
    
Differences 56-98 -0.61 2.99 2.61 
 (1.30) (4.21) (1.40) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 28: Results – Outlay Equivalent Ratios, Rich Female Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Alcohol  Personal Care  Jewel  Gambling  Sport  Entertainment  
Boys 0-4 -2.50 -0.20 2.11 1.27 29.82 5.92 
 (1.45) (0.96) (2.36) (1.75) (202.00) (4.80) 
       
Girls 0-4 1.54 0.49 -0.54 3.14 52.34 -3.41 
 (1.18) (0.83) (1.15) (1.65) (366.77) (3.18) 
       
Boys 5-14 -1.47 -0.86 -0.29 -1.56 -8.94 0.30 
 (0.97) (0.58) (1.17) (1.11) (65.09) (1.96) 
       
Girls 5-14 -1.77 -1.37* -1.68 -2.70* 116.58 0.28 
 (1.08) (0.68) (1.18) (1.37) (830.29) (1.83) 
       
Men 15-55 0.03 -0.86* 0.38 0.35 -15.61 -1.51 
 (0.47) (0.38) (1.82) (0.57) (119.17) (1.61) 
       
Women 15-55 -0.56 0.36 -0.44 -0.15 -103.18 -0.71 
 (0.80) (0.54) (2.07) (1.11) (736.05) (2.01) 
       
Men 56-84 2.10 1.16 -1.78 2.14 -33.86 -14.92 
 (2.26) (2.13) (2.81) (3.60) (228.71) (9.20) 
       
Women 56-84 -0.78 -0.13 0.01 -0.67 23.70 -1.84 
 (0.98) (1.33) (1.58) (0.89) (178.46) (3.74) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 29: Results – Differences, Rich Female Headed Households 
 (2) (4) 
 Personal Care  Gambling  
Differences 0-4 -0.70 -1.87 
 (1.13) (2.64) 
   
Differences 5-14 0.51 1.13 
 (0.59) (0.79) 
   
Differences 15-55 -1.21 0.50 
 (0.66) (1.27) 
   
Differences 56-84 1.29 2.81 
 (2.94) (4.04) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 30: Results – Outlay Equivalent Ratios, Rich Male Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Alcohol  Personal Care  Jewel  Gambling  Sport  Cigarette  
Boys 0-4 -1.14 -0.05 -8.77 -0.41 1.11 2.56 
 (0.94) (0.63) (18.43) (1.76) (4.03) (5.85) 
       
Girls 0-4 -1.92* -0.27 -11.78 1.62 -2.42 2.38 
 (0.89) (0.59) (23.45) (2.55) (3.37) (5.38) 
       
Boys 5-14 0.07 0.17 -34.69 1.27 3.53 7.04 
 (0.77) (0.51) (47.69) (3.36) (2.83) (12.06) 
       
Girls 5-14 -1.01 0.11 -13.11 -0.30 0.60 3.86 
 (0.77) (0.41) (24.43) (1.64) (3.06) (5.49) 
       
Men 15-55 -0.44 -0.12 3.88 -2.29 -3.40 8.09 
 (0.58) (0.37) (7.51) (2.73) (2.30) (12.63) 
       
Women 15-55 0.02 0.94 19.50 -2.19 -2.79 -1.97 
 (0.70) (0.62) (30.12) (3.56) (1.84) (5.06) 
       
Men 56-82 -1.70 2.13 -0.36 3.13 -6.76 -0.83 
 (1.33) (1.36) (15.32) (6.11) (6.87) (9.56) 
       
Women 56-82 0.12 -0.91 24.92 7.83 -5.50 0.74 
 (0.88) (0.81) (38.74) (9.38) (4.15) (8.11) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 31: Results – Differences, Rich Male Headed Households 
 (1) 
 Alcohol  
Differences 0-4 0.79 
 (1.14) 
  
Differences 5-14 1.08 
 (0.63) 
  
Differences 15-55 -0.46 
 (0.91) 
  
Differences 56-82 -1.82 
 (1.58) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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7 Discussion 
 
Using the 1st wave of the NIDS and the outlay-equivalence ratios methodology, 
proposed in Deaton (1989), I investigated whether South African households 
discriminated against their girl children. Additionally, I investigated whether household 
heads favored children matching their sex. In a sample of South African households 
disaggregated by gender and income, I did find statistically significant but practically 
insignificant evidence, suggesting a preference for 0-4-year-old boys over 0-4-year-old 
girls. Out of the sample of poor female headed households, my analysis found that an 
additional 0-4-year-old boy reduced entertainment expenditure by as much as 126%, 
per household member, while girls of the same age had a statistically insignificant 
impact on their household’s entertainment expenditure.  
However, an issue arises when practically interpreting my results. I’ve stated 
emphatically that the median more accurately reflects a South African household than 
the mean does. The median entertainment expenditure for poor female headed 
households is 0 rand, implying significant inequality amongst their households. Using 
the mean, for practical interpretation, would result in something that is non-
generalizable, further diminishing the practical significance of my results. Additionally, 
given the several adult goods examined, entertainment was the only 1 of 7 possible 
pathways that discrimination was observed through. Putting my results in practical 
context significantly diminishes the weight of my findings, making it difficult to state 
with any certainty whether gender discrimination took place in poor female headed 
households and likely suggesting that no discrimination took place.      
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In addition, my analysis found no evidence, in the sample of all South African 
households, suggesting that an average South African household discriminated against 
its girl children. My analysis also found from the samples of rich male, rich female and 
poor male headed households, no evidence suggesting that they significantly favored 
either their boy or girl children.  
8 Conclusion 
 
I assumed, for my thesis, based on evidence about South African attitudes on 
gender equality (Ipsos 2016) that a household level gender bias could exist, wherein 
parents favored children matching their own sex. In the developing world, a significant 
amount of research (Garg et. al. 1998 Gibson and Rozelle 2004 Kingdon 2005 Saha 2013 
and Parpiev at. al. 2012) suggests a household level gender bias exists in Ghana, Papua 
New Guinea, India and Uzbekistan. However, there was no research to suggest that the 
gender bias in South Africa is so ingrained that it significantly affects the quality of life 
for South African boys and girls, at the household level. Based on my findings and South 
Africa’s context with gender inequality, it’s very likely I didn’t find significant evidence of 
a gender bias, because South Africa doesn’t have a household level gender bias, in favor 
of boys or girls.   
Additionally, the lack of significant results may come down to the quality of the 
expenditure and income data in the NIDS. The 1st wave of the NIDS has a significant 
number of missing values for both non-food expenditure items and income. To account 
for those missing values, the NIDS used two techniques, cell median imputation and 
regression imputation. However, it’s the construction of the regression imputation 
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technique which potentially affected the quality of my analysis, which, per Argent 
(2009) and Levinsohn et. al. (2009) was used for every missing non-food expenditure 
and income value. Regression imputation works by using a set of demographic and 
independent variables to construct a model which predicts for what the missing 
expenditure values would have been. An issue arises, in that many of the same 
demographic controls used for the regression imputation technique, I also make use of 
for my analysis. Using expenditure and income variables, with full imputations and the 
same demographic controls used for those imputations, resulted in double controlling 
for the demographic differences between households. That over-controlling limits the 
explanatory power of my analysis, reducing its overall quality. There may be value in 
doing the same analysis with expenditure and income variables that don’t have full 
imputations. Unfortunately, the number of missing income and non-food expenditure 
values would significantly diminish the sample sizes for an approach that did not use 
variables with imputations.  
I believed that creating samples separated by income would appropriately 
capture the different contexts for poor and rich households. Although, research by 
Arndt et. al. (2006) suggested that disaggregating by income and region may have better 
controlled for a household’s wealth, relative to where they live, providing a more 
accurate depiction of households in South Africa, I did not do that for my thesis. In 
context of my own research, I was concerned that applying an additional to layer to 
samples already separated by gender and income would over-control for differences 
between households, resulting in non-generalizable results.  
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I hypothesized that a South African household head’s gender could bias how 
they apportioned resources amongst their children. There were limitations in the data 
and approach I used, impacting the quality of my analysis. Ultimately, using Deaton’s 
(1989) outlay-equivalence ratio methodology and the 1st wave of the National Income 
Dynamics Study, I did not find any practically significant evidence supporting that South 
African households discriminated against their girl children or that South African 
households headed exclusively by men or women preferred children matching their own 
sex.  
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A Appendix 
A.1 Engel Curves – All Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Per-Capita 
Jewel 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Cigarette 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Sport 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Personal Care 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Alcohol 
Spending 
Log of Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
0.0004 -0.0032*** 0.0003* 0.0007 -0.0004 
 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
      
Log of Household Size -0.0003 -0.0028* -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0018 
 (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0011) 
      
Boys 0-4 0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0001 0.0024 0.0047 
 (0.0017) (0.0074) (0.0019) (0.0096) (0.0063) 
      
Girls 0-4 0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0020 
 (0.0020) (0.0070) (0.0017) (0.0085) (0.0058) 
      
Boys 5-14 0.0034 0.0048 0.0019 -0.0076 0.0019 
 (0.0024) (0.0071) (0.0019) (0.0072) (0.0055) 
      
Girls 5-14 0.0025 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0071 -0.0002 
 (0.0023) (0.0070) (0.0016) (0.0074) (0.0058) 
      
Men 15-55 0.0031 0.0109 0.0002 -0.0077 0.0070 
 (0.0026) (0.0064) (0.0017) (0.0067) (0.0048) 
      
Women 15-55 0.0023 -0.0014 0.0008 0.0037 0.0050 
 (0.0015) (0.0061) (0.0017) (0.0056) (0.0039) 
      
Men 56-101 0.0005 0.0053 0.0021 -0.0101 0.0054 
 (0.0020) (0.0107) (0.0031) (0.0092) (0.0082) 
      
Coloured 0.0000 0.0129*** -0.0003 0.0012 0.0009 
 (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
      
Asian/Indian -0.0009 0.0115** -0.0010* 0.0033 -0.0025 
 (0.0006) (0.0036) (0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0017) 
      
White -0.0004 0.0211*** 0.0010 -0.0005 0.0018 
 (0.0008) (0.0041) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0017) 
      
Living with Partner -0.0007* 0.0025 0.0006 0.0017 0.0074** 
 (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0005) (0.0029) (0.0025) 
      
Widow/Widower 0.0001 0.0012 0.0003 0.0027 -0.0005 
 (0.0005) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0011) 
      
Divorced/Seperated 0.0007 0.0013 0.0019 0.0005 -0.0007 
 (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
      
Never Married 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0018 0.0000 
 (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0013) 
      
Tribal Authority Areas -0.0000 -0.0042** -0.0002 0.0022 -0.0001 
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 (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0012) 
      
Urban Informal 0.0004 -0.0030* -0.0004 0.0066 -0.0005 
 (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0035) (0.0018) 
      
Rural Formal -0.0003 0.0029 0.0004 0.0023 0.0047* 
 (0.0002) (0.0022) (0.0004) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
      
Age -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
Gender -0.0003 -0.0041*** -0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0048*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
      
No Schooling 0.0001 0.0025 -0.0001 0.0024 -0.0016 
 (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0013) 
      
Grade R/0 - 3 Completed -0.0006 0.0051* 0.0001 0.0034 0.0029 
 (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0004) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
      
Grade 8 - 9 Completed -0.0006 0.0048* -0.0003 0.0025 -0.0019 
 (0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
      
Grade 10 - 11 Completed -0.0007 0.0031 -0.0001 0.0045 -0.0022 
 (0.0005) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0017) 
      
Grade 12 Completed 0.0003 -0.0016 0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0044** 
 (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0023) (0.0017) 
      
Certificate or Diploma Std 
10 completed or NTC 
-0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0046** 
 (0.0008) (0.0025) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0015) 
      
Bachelor’s degree or 
Honour’s degree 
-0.0017* -0.0004 0.0012 0.0022 -0.0042 
 (0.0008) (0.0034) (0.0010) (0.0043) (0.0021) 
      
Masters or Doctorate 0.0008 -0.0145** 0.0036 -0.0087 0.0035 
 (0.0008) (0.0045) (0.0027) (0.0045) (0.0032) 
      
Other -0.0011 0.0184* -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0022 
 (0.0007) (0.0080) (0.0008) (0.0049) (0.0115) 
      
Constant -0.0029 0.0291*** -0.0024 0.0186 0.0166* 
 (0.0021) (0.0085) (0.0016) (0.0097) (0.0084) 
R2 0.011 0.110 0.044 0.025 0.049 
Observations 3528 3528 3528 3528 3528 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A.2 Engel Curves – Female Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Per-Capita 
Personal 
Care 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Jewel 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Gambling 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Cigarette 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Entertainment 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Sport 
Spending 
Log of Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
0.0029* 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0034* 0.0024* 0.0003 
 (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0002) 
       
Log of Household Size 0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0012 0.0006 
 (0.0030) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0003) 
       
Boys 0-4 0.0102 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0071 -0.0147 -0.0078* 
 (0.0182) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0082) (0.0111) (0.0034) 
       
Girls 0-4 -0.0019 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0043 -0.0126 -0.0062 
 (0.0158) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0087) (0.0105) (0.0033) 
       
Boys 5-14 -0.0083 0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0115 -0.0043 
 (0.0140) (0.0037) (0.0012) (0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0027) 
       
Girls 5-14 -0.0087 -0.0021 0.0014 -0.0030 -0.0060 -0.0058* 
 (0.0144) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0087) (0.0062) (0.0029) 
       
Men 15-55 -0.0119 0.0021 0.0008 0.0065 -0.0115 -0.0070* 
 (0.0132) (0.0044) (0.0018) (0.0074) (0.0120) (0.0032) 
       
Women 15-55 0.0025 0.0027 -0.0010 0.0040 -0.0060 -0.0027 
 (0.0097) (0.0027) (0.0009) (0.0071) (0.0058) (0.0033) 
       
Men 56-101 -0.0422* 0.0002 -0.0041 -0.0061 -0.0214 -0.0073* 
 (0.0212) (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0136) (0.0144) (0.0035) 
       
Coloured 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0183** -0.0018 0.0000 
 (0.0032) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0008) 
       
Asian/Indian 0.0053 -0.0010 -0.0014* 0.0114 -0.0097 -0.0014 
 (0.0066) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0007) 
       
White 0.0060 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0253*** 0.0000 0.0063 
 (0.0073) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0065) (0.0042) (0.0064) 
       
Living with Partner -0.0112** -0.0001 -0.0011 0.0060 -0.0002 0.0006 
 (0.0043) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0069) (0.0026) (0.0006) 
       
Widow/Widower 0.0029 0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0007 
 (0.0031) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0004) 
       
Divorced/Seperated -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0028 0.0023 
 (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0018) 
       
Never Married 0.0038 0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0044* -0.0016 0.0003 
 (0.0032) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0004) 
       
Tribal Authority Areas 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0063* -0.0014 -0.0002 
 (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0004) 
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Urban Informal 0.0021 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0003 
 (0.0044) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0004) 
       
Rural Formal 0.0025 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0024 0.0048 0.0001 
 (0.0038) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0039) (0.0067) (0.0005) 
       
Age -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
       
No Schooling 0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0059 -0.0016 0.0003 
 (0.0033) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0005) 
       
Grade R/0 - 3 
Completed 
0.0022 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0055* -0.0022 0.0004 
 (0.0041) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0003) 
       
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.0058 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0023 0.0000 
 (0.0042) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0002) 
       
Grade 10 - 11 
Completed 
0.0015 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0022 0.0007 
 (0.0037) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0011) 
       
Grade 12 Completed -0.0044 0.0018 0.0025 0.0006 0.0019 0.0027 
 (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0017) 
       
Certificate or Diploma 
Std 10 completed or 
NTC 
-0.0070 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0013 0.0005 
 (0.0043) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0011) 
       
Bachelor’s degree or 
Honour’s degree 
0.0188 -0.0007 0.0011 0.0128 0.0011 -0.0017 
 (0.0147) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0110) (0.0059) (0.0016) 
       
Masters or Doctorate -0.0345* 0.0013 0.0036 -0.0250 -0.0013 -0.0040 
 (0.0165) (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0144) (0.0057) (0.0035) 
       
Other -0.0024 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0033 -0.0030 0.0002 
 (0.0075) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0010) 
       
Constant 0.0076 -0.0021 0.0027 0.0247* -0.0028 0.0014 
 (0.0151) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0106) (0.0055) (0.0031) 
R2 0.037 0.011 0.032 0.113 0.031 0.027 
Observations 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A.3 Engel Curves – Male Headed Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Per-Capita 
Alcohol 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Personal 
Care 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Jewel 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Gambling 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Cigarette 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Sport 
Spending 
Log of Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
-0.0017 -0.0019 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0061*** 0.0003 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0002) 
       
Log of Household Size -0.0058 -0.0056 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0094** -0.0004 
 (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0034) (0.0006) 
       
Boys 0-4 -0.0077 -0.0169 0.0066* -0.0120 -0.0340 0.0061 
 (0.0172) (0.0204) (0.0030) (0.0062) (0.0284) (0.0047) 
       
Girls 0-4 -0.0292 -0.0245 0.0058* -0.0053 -0.0387 0.0036 
 (0.0159) (0.0195) (0.0029) (0.0068) (0.0280) (0.0045) 
       
Boys 5-14 -0.0171 -0.0268 0.0092 -0.0090 -0.0192 0.0093 
 (0.0159) (0.0174) (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0234) (0.0054) 
       
Girls 5-14 -0.0218 -0.0217 0.0085* -0.0118* -0.0370 0.0058 
 (0.0159) (0.0178) (0.0037) (0.0059) (0.0285) (0.0044) 
       
Men 15-55 -0.0147 -0.0096 0.0022 -0.0098 -0.0221 0.0074 
 (0.0136) (0.0165) (0.0021) (0.0053) (0.0254) (0.0045) 
       
Women 15-55 -0.0064 -0.0014 0.0009 -0.0091 -0.0492 0.0063 
 (0.0122) (0.0148) (0.0017) (0.0056) (0.0285) (0.0048) 
       
Men 56-101 -0.0340 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0122* -0.0668* 0.0104 
 (0.0229) (0.0254) (0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0322) (0.0074) 
       
Coloured 0.0012 0.0029 0.0002 -0.0015 0.0204*** -0.0005 
 (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0046) (0.0006) 
       
Asian/Indian -0.0041 0.0056 -0.0006 -0.0028 0.0188*** -0.0015* 
 (0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0054) (0.0007) 
       
White 0.0048 0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0035* 0.0388*** 0.0001 
 (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0080) (0.0008) 
       
Living with Partner 0.0080* 0.0038 -0.0017* 0.0021 0.0070 0.0008 
 (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0037) (0.0008) 
       
Widow/Widower 0.0005 -0.0029 -0.0012 0.0001 0.0102 -0.0015** 
 (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0073) (0.0005) 
       
Divorced/Seperated 0.0087 -0.0003 0.0125 -0.0012 -0.0061 0.0079 
 (0.0075) (0.0053) (0.0103) (0.0008) (0.0078) (0.0065) 
       
Never Married 0.0117 -0.0035 -0.0019* 0.0002 0.0096 -0.0002 
 (0.0079) (0.0055) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0004) 
       
Tribal Authority Areas -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0069* -0.0005 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0032) (0.0005) 
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Urban Informal -0.0059 0.0116 -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0112** -0.0007 
 (0.0041) (0.0081) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0005) 
       
Rural Formal 0.0077 0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0008 0.0027 0.0005 
 (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0045) (0.0007) 
       
Age 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0004* 0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
       
No Schooling -0.0054 0.0047 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0028 -0.0003 
 (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0036) (0.0006) 
       
Grade R/0 - 3 
Completed 
0.0007 0.0041 -0.0013 -0.0010* 0.0075 -0.0004 
 (0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0050) (0.0009) 
       
Grade 8 - 9 Completed -0.0004 0.0020 -0.0022 0.0005 0.0165** -0.0007 
 (0.0050) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0053) (0.0005) 
       
Grade 10 - 11 
Completed 
-0.0026 0.0099 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0099* -0.0007 
 (0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0044) (0.0006) 
       
Grade 12 Completed -0.0062 0.0026 -0.0016 0.0018 -0.0001 0.0012 
 (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0038) (0.0010) 
       
Certificate or Diploma 
Std 10 completed or 
NTC 
-0.0072* 0.0035 -0.0026 0.0037 0.0035 0.0001 
 (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0065) (0.0007) 
       
Bachelor’s degree or 
Honour’s degree 
-0.0057 -0.0007 -0.0037* 0.0000 -0.0042 0.0035 
 (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0052) (0.0021) 
       
Masters or Doctorate 0.0027 -0.0065 0.0006 0.0012 -0.0212** 0.0050 
 (0.0056) (0.0045) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0070) (0.0040) 
       
Other 0.0065 -0.0070 -0.0034 0.0012 0.0269*** -0.0014 
 (0.0254) (0.0074) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0063) (0.0008) 
       
Constant 0.0445* 0.0567** -0.0009 0.0103 0.0725* -0.0088* 
 (0.0186) (0.0216) (0.0029) (0.0065) (0.0281) (0.0043) 
R2 0.040 0.045 0.054 0.035 0.141 0.095 
Observations 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A.4 Engel Curves – Poor Female Headed Households  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Per-
Capita 
Alcohol 
Spending 
Per-
Capita 
Personal 
Care 
Spending 
Per-
Capita 
Jewel 
Spending 
Per-
Capita 
Gambling 
Spending 
Per-
Capita 
Cigarette 
Spending 
Per-
Capita 
Sport 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Entertainment 
Spending 
Log of Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
0.0009 0.0037** 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0037* 0.0004 0.0023 
 (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0014) 
        
Log of Household 
Size 
0.0006 0.0032 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0004 0.0015 
 (0.0011) (0.0032) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0019) 
        
Boys 0-4 -0.0006 0.0078 -0.0014 -0.0008 0.0006 -0.0043 -0.0167 
 (0.0069) (0.0198) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0075) (0.0027) (0.0123) 
        
Girls 0-4 -0.0026 -0.0044 -0.0012 -0.0000 0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0133 
 (0.0071) (0.0172) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0079) (0.0025) (0.0117) 
        
Boys 5-14 -0.0004 -0.0088 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0057 -0.0021 -0.0139 
 (0.0058) (0.0153) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0098) (0.0018) (0.0116) 
        
Girls 5-14 -0.0030 -0.0105 -0.0024 0.0019 0.0030 -0.0026 -0.0077 
 (0.0061) (0.0157) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0082) (0.0017) (0.0069) 
        
Men 15-55 0.0036 -0.0112 0.0020 0.0010 0.0112 -0.0043 -0.0122 
 (0.0058) (0.0145) (0.0049) (0.0020) (0.0068) (0.0027) (0.0132) 
        
Women 15-55 0.0071 0.0017 0.0029 -0.0009 0.0089 -0.0022 -0.0076 
 (0.0040) (0.0103) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0068) (0.0020) (0.0062) 
        
Men 56-101 0.0423 -0.0455* 0.0003 -0.0036 -0.0001 -0.0047 -0.0189 
 (0.0294) (0.0219) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0132) (0.0028) (0.0141) 
        
Coloured 0.0027 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0196** -0.0004 -0.0017 
 (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0065) (0.0005) (0.0025) 
        
Asian/Indian -0.0065* -0.0031 -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0257** -0.0014 -0.0106 
 (0.0027) (0.0065) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0089) (0.0009) (0.0070) 
        
White 0.0020 0.0157 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0170 -0.0007 -0.0031 
 (0.0029) (0.0120) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0119) (0.0005) (0.0031) 
        
Living with Partner 0.0098* -0.0118** -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0068 0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0069) (0.0004) (0.0027) 
        
Widow/Widower -0.0004 0.0031 0.0002 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0005 0.0003 
 (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0017) 
        
Divorced/Seperated -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0022 
 (0.0017) (0.0040) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0042) (0.0004) (0.0021) 
        
Never Married 0.0003 0.0032 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0033 -0.0001 -0.0015 
 (0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0016) 
        
Tribal Authority 0.0009 0.0012 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0062* -0.0004 -0.0013 
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Areas 
 (0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0031) (0.0004) (0.0020) 
        
Urban Informal 0.0027 0.0025 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0021 
 (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0004) (0.0025) 
        
Rural Formal 0.0045 0.0021 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0032 0.0001 0.0049 
 (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0040) (0.0005) (0.0068) 
        
Age -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        
No Schooling -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0000 0.0059 0.0001 -0.0020 
 (0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0031) 
        
Grade R/0 - 3 
Completed 
0.0051 0.0020 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0055* 0.0004 -0.0022 
 (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0023) 
        
Grade 8 - 9 
Completed 
-0.0040** 0.0056 -0.0000 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0000 -0.0024 
 (0.0015) (0.0044) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0025) 
        
Grade 10 - 11 
Completed 
-0.0040* 0.0022 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0010 -0.0019 
 (0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0019) 
        
Grade 12 Completed -0.0049* -0.0063 0.0022 0.0024 -0.0015 0.0008 0.0010 
 (0.0019) (0.0043) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.0046) 
        
Certificate or 
Diploma Std 10 
completed or NTC 
-0.0037 -0.0074 0.0005 0.0010 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0013 
 (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0006) (0.0036) 
        
Bachelor’s degree or 
Honour’s degree 
-0.0035 0.0343 -0.0007 0.0012 0.0328 -0.0002 0.0026 
 (0.0027) (0.0264) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0248) (0.0004) (0.0101) 
        
Masters or 
Doctorate 
0.0018 -0.0513 -0.0001 0.0075*** -0.0312 -0.0016 0.0029 
 (0.0028) (0.0267) (0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0249) (0.0011) (0.0094) 
        
Other -0.0062** -0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0036 0.0004 -0.0031 
 (0.0019) (0.0071) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0034) (0.0006) (0.0026) 
        
Constant -0.0031 0.0038 -0.0027 0.0023 0.0196 -0.0003 -0.0007 
 (0.0070) (0.0163) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0106) (0.0015) (0.0058) 
R2 0.041 0.041 0.013 0.032 0.112 0.009 0.024 
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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A.5 Engel Curves – Poor Male Headed Households  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Per-Capita 
Personal 
Care 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Jewel 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Gambling 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Cigarette 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Sport 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Entertainment 
Spending 
Log of Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
0.0009 0.0004 0.0008** -0.0030* 0.0005* 0.0042* 
 (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0020) 
       
Log of Household Size -0.0056 -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0101** -0.0002 0.0073 
 (0.0056) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0005) (0.0055) 
       
Boys 0-4 -0.0145 0.0030 -0.0063 -0.0353 -0.0013 0.0170 
 (0.0285) (0.0023) (0.0054) (0.0249) (0.0046) (0.0091) 
       
Girls 0-4 -0.0272 0.0018 0.0002 -0.0406 -0.0032 0.0141 
 (0.0259) (0.0023) (0.0065) (0.0242) (0.0047) (0.0105) 
       
Boys 5-14 -0.0329 0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0287 -0.0004 0.0072 
 (0.0240) (0.0026) (0.0053) (0.0218) (0.0048) (0.0068) 
       
Girls 5-14 -0.0262 0.0040 -0.0063 -0.0462* -0.0006 0.0210 
 (0.0235) (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0234) (0.0048) (0.0142) 
       
Men 15-55 -0.0079 0.0019 -0.0030 -0.0295 0.0019 0.0231 
 (0.0226) (0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0253) (0.0051) (0.0137) 
       
Women 15-55 -0.0034 0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0496* -0.0000 0.0197 
 (0.0198) (0.0013) (0.0038) (0.0253) (0.0046) (0.0124) 
       
Men 56-101 -0.0127 -0.0006 -0.0101 -0.0697* 0.0055 0.0211 
 (0.0333) (0.0018) (0.0055) (0.0279) (0.0079) (0.0126) 
       
Coloured 0.0030 0.0010 -0.0018 0.0212*** 0.0002 0.0004 
 (0.0055) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0057) (0.0007) (0.0021) 
       
Asian/Indian 0.0177 -0.0008 -0.0030* 0.0222 -0.0014 -0.0092 
 (0.0096) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0135) (0.0007) (0.0061) 
       
White 0.0021 -0.0014 -0.0056** 0.0460* 0.0014 -0.0038 
 (0.0118) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0200) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
       
Living with Partner 0.0035 -0.0012 0.0022 0.0054 0.0010 0.0005 
 (0.0049) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0036) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
       
Widow/Widower -0.0027 -0.0010 -0.0000 0.0116 -0.0010 -0.0001 
 (0.0053) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0089) (0.0005) (0.0022) 
       
Divorced/Seperated -0.0106 -0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0177 0.0188 0.0032 
 (0.0076) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0093) (0.0140) (0.0078) 
       
Never Married -0.0037 -0.0011 0.0005 0.0098 0.0001 0.0065* 
 (0.0058) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0060) (0.0004) (0.0032) 
       
Tribal Authority Areas 0.0019 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0055 -0.0003 0.0029 
 (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0033) (0.0005) (0.0044) 
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Urban Informal 0.0127 -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0107** -0.0005 -0.0016 
 (0.0086) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
       
Rural Formal 0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0023 0.0006 0.0009 
 (0.0051) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0046) (0.0008) (0.0019) 
       
Age -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
       
No Schooling 0.0050 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0038 -0.0005 -0.0011 
 (0.0040) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0036) (0.0007) (0.0017) 
       
Grade R/0 - 3 
Completed 
0.0035 -0.0002 -0.0012* 0.0071 -0.0006 -0.0024 
 (0.0053) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0049) (0.0010) (0.0013) 
       
Grade 8 - 9 Completed 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0007 0.0148** -0.0010 0.0065 
 (0.0048) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0057) (0.0006) (0.0079) 
       
Grade 10 - 11 
Completed 
0.0084 -0.0008* -0.0002 0.0048 -0.0010 -0.0004 
 (0.0061) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0041) (0.0006) (0.0013) 
       
Grade 12 Completed 0.0015 0.0014 0.0023 -0.0026 0.0004 0.0017 
 (0.0060) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0039) (0.0010) (0.0020) 
       
Certificate or Diploma 
Std 10 completed or 
NTC 
0.0052 -0.0008 0.0069 -0.0046 0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.0067) (0.0007) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0010) (0.0016) 
       
Bachelor’s degree or 
Honour’s degree 
-0.0079 -0.0020 -0.0028* -0.0092 -0.0017 0.0185* 
 (0.0108) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0057) (0.0010) (0.0073) 
       
Other -0.0139 -0.0003 0.0022 0.0143 -0.0029 -0.0010 
 (0.0129) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0198) (0.0021) (0.0025) 
       
Constant 0.0411 -0.0018 -0.0008 0.0686** -0.0030 -0.0553 
 (0.0274) (0.0019) (0.0043) (0.0257) (0.0043) (0.0321) 
R2 0.043 0.024 0.054 0.123 0.067 0.036 
Observations 1348 1348 1348 1348 1348 1348 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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A.6 Engel Curves – Rich Female Headed Households  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Per-Capita 
Alcohol 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Personal 
Care 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Jewel 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Gambling 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Entertainment 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Sport 
Spending 
Log of Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
-0.0021 -0.0010 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0023 -0.0017 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
       
Log of Household Size -0.0083 -0.0073 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0069 0.0068 
 (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
       
Boys 0-4 -0.0253 -0.0017 0.0023 0.0039 0.0461 -0.0023 
 (0.0208) (0.0400) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0336) (0.0411) 
       
Girls 0-4 0.0341 0.0146 -0.0006 0.0076* -0.0093 -0.0106 
 (0.0230) (0.0387) (0.0012) (0.0037) (0.0241) (0.0362) 
       
Boys 5-14 -0.0103 -0.0171 -0.0003 -0.0018 0.0127 0.0121 
 (0.0148) (0.0330) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0233) (0.0464) 
       
Girls 5-14 -0.0147 -0.0289 -0.0019 -0.0040 0.0126 -0.0345 
 (0.0196) (0.0333) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0204) (0.0198) 
       
Men 15-55 0.0118 -0.0169 0.0004 0.0020 0.0020 0.0146 
 (0.0129) (0.0323) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0225) (0.0451) 
       
Women 15-55 0.0031 0.0114 -0.0005 0.0010 0.0067 0.0471 
 (0.0152) (0.0312) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0222) (0.0790) 
       
Men 56-101 0.0424 0.0302 -0.0020 0.0056 -0.0776 0.0214 
 (0.0364) (0.0681) (0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0544) (0.0564) 
       
Coloured -0.0005 0.0112 0.0012 0.0003 -0.0025 0.0099 
 (0.0035) (0.0066) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0050) (0.0052) 
       
Asian/Indian 0.0021 0.0067 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0143* -0.0076 
 (0.0076) (0.0119) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0064) (0.0099) 
       
White -0.0011 0.0111 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0031 0.0128 
 (0.0047) (0.0073) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0073) (0.0121) 
       
Living with Partner 0.0870*** -0.0122 0.0015 -0.0029 0.0030 -0.0146 
 (0.0158) (0.0192) (0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0168) (0.0175) 
       
Widow/Widower -0.0060 -0.0042 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0084 0.0055 
 (0.0049) (0.0065) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0061) (0.0076) 
       
Divorced/Seperated -0.0057 -0.0032 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0084 0.0289 
 (0.0050) (0.0073) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0060) (0.0204) 
       
Never Married -0.0081 0.0055 0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0016 0.0050 
 (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0055) (0.0070) 
       
Tribal Authority Areas -0.0042 -0.0057 -0.0000 0.0005 -0.0064 -0.0026 
 (0.0035) (0.0056) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0046) (0.0054) 
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Urban Informal -0.0013 -0.0245** -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0057 -0.0193 
 (0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0081) (0.0237) 
       
Rural Formal 0.0119 0.0127 0.0006 0.0028* -0.0101 0.0044 
 (0.0086) (0.0150) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0082) (0.0084) 
       
Age -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
       
No Schooling 0.0103 0.0206 0.0002 0.0005 0.0210* 0.0184 
 (0.0067) (0.0108) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0084) (0.0125) 
       
Grade R/0 - 3 
Completed 
0.0018 0.0069 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0030 -0.0072 
 (0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0043) (0.0094) 
       
Grade 8 - 9 Completed -0.0013 0.0174* 0.0008 0.0012 0.0010 0.0196 
 (0.0048) (0.0083) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0065) (0.0184) 
       
Grade 10 - 11 
Completed 
0.0004 0.0009 0.0010 0.0014 -0.0082 0.0172 
 (0.0057) (0.0093) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0062) (0.0166) 
       
Grade 12 Completed 0.0134 0.0157* 0.0002 0.0041** 0.0045 0.0337 
 (0.0068) (0.0076) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0061) (0.0257) 
       
Certificate or Diploma 
Std 10 completed or 
NTC 
0.0008 0.0033 0.0005 0.0009 0.0018 0.0055 
 (0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0052) (0.0065) 
       
Bachelor’s degree or 
Honour’s degree 
-0.0008 0.0211* -0.0000 0.0005 0.0018 0.0141 
 (0.0059) (0.0082) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0066) (0.0117) 
       
Masters or Doctorate 0.0127 -0.0210 0.0020 0.0012 -0.0123 -0.0151 
 (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0083) (0.0160) 
       
Constant 0.0393 0.0368 -0.0015 0.0009 -0.0179 -0.0396 
 (0.0279) (0.0416) (0.0017) (0.0047) (0.0332) (0.0844) 
R2 0.521 0.435 0.067 0.459 0.315 0.231 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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A.7 Engel Curves – Rich Male Headed Households  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Per-Capita 
Alcohol 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Personal 
Care 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Jewel 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Gambling 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Cigarette 
Spending 
Per-Capita 
Sport 
Spending 
Log of Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
-0.0023 -0.0057*** -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0131** 0.0004 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0049) (0.0004) 
       
Log of Household Size -0.0077 -0.0022 -0.0096* -0.0019 -0.0036 -0.0010 
 (0.0063) (0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0018) (0.0116) (0.0015) 
       
Boys 0-4 -0.0174 0.0122 0.0155 -0.0135 -0.0097 0.0202 
 (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0576) (0.0117) 
       
Girls 0-4 -0.0242 0.0106 0.0250* -0.0097 -0.0074 0.0118 
 (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0108) (0.0097) (0.0539) (0.0087) 
       
Boys 5-14 0.0033 0.0194 0.0359* -0.0108 0.0164 0.0256* 
 (0.0190) (0.0162) (0.0170) (0.0084) (0.0473) (0.0103) 
       
Girls 5-14 -0.0097 0.0170 0.0262* -0.0126 -0.0029 0.0191* 
 (0.0189) (0.0161) (0.0111) (0.0093) (0.0607) (0.0090) 
       
Men 15-55 -0.0119 0.0059 -0.0019 -0.0177 0.0138 0.0135* 
 (0.0203) (0.0167) (0.0099) (0.0112) (0.0483) (0.0056) 
       
Women 15-55 0.0030 0.0320* -0.0028 -0.0155 -0.0336 0.0132* 
 (0.0138) (0.0154) (0.0071) (0.0118) (0.0563) (0.0065) 
       
Men 56-101 -0.0238 0.0517 0.0007 -0.0108 -0.0438 0.0117 
 (0.0265) (0.0268) (0.0117) (0.0089) (0.0697) (0.0070) 
       
Coloured 0.0014 0.0075* -0.0033 0.0002 0.0207** -0.0017 
 (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0008) (0.0078) (0.0015) 
       
Asian/Indian 0.0009 0.0091* -0.0021 0.0009 0.0249** -0.0020 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0012) (0.0082) (0.0018) 
       
White 0.0081 0.0095* -0.0016 -0.0001 0.0414*** -0.0003 
 (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0098) (0.0018) 
       
Living with Partner 0.0186 -0.0042 -0.0054 -0.0002 0.0155 -0.0015 
 (0.0114) (0.0070) (0.0032) (0.0013) (0.0162) (0.0014) 
       
Widow/Widower -0.0000 -0.0083 -0.0027 -0.0012 -0.0098 -0.0008 
 (0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0037) (0.0011) (0.0202) (0.0013) 
       
Divorced/Seperated 0.0141 0.0119 0.0173 -0.0010 0.0022 0.0007 
 (0.0078) (0.0068) (0.0129) (0.0012) (0.0094) (0.0031) 
       
Never Married -0.0073 -0.0148*** -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0147 -0.0036 
 (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0011) (0.0147) (0.0021) 
       
Tribal Authority Areas 0.0233 -0.0048 -0.0056 0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0019 
 (0.0131) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0016) 
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Urban Informal 0.0113 -0.0124 -0.0084* -0.0029 -0.0169 -0.0015 
 (0.0108) (0.0097) (0.0042) (0.0018) (0.0131) (0.0024) 
       
Rural Formal 0.0122 -0.0013 -0.0026 -0.0016 0.0037 0.0002 
 (0.0065) (0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0012) (0.0159) (0.0011) 
       
Age -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0010 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0001) 
       
No Schooling -0.0141 -0.0048 -0.0027 -0.0030 -0.0222 0.0019 
 (0.0135) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0025) (0.0188) (0.0015) 
       
Grade R/0 - 3 
Completed 
0.0117 -0.0072 -0.0098 -0.0050 -0.0127 0.0029 
 (0.0134) (0.0060) (0.0076) (0.0030) (0.0131) (0.0017) 
       
Grade 8 - 9 Completed -0.0076 0.0094* -0.0062 -0.0005 0.0167 0.0005 
 (0.0056) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0012) (0.0094) (0.0011) 
       
Grade 10 - 11 
Completed 
0.0076 0.0138* -0.0023 0.0023 0.0244 0.0002 
 (0.0090) (0.0055) (0.0079) (0.0018) (0.0164) (0.0011) 
       
Grade 12 Completed -0.0038 0.0050 -0.0147 -0.0007 0.0081 0.0027 
 (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0086) (0.0010) (0.0091) (0.0021) 
       
Certificate or Diploma 
Std 10 completed or 
NTC 
-0.0041 0.0050 -0.0129 -0.0003 0.0181 0.0012 
 (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0081) (0.0011) (0.0128) (0.0012) 
       
Bachelor’s degree or 
Honour’s degree 
0.0015 0.0057 -0.0146 -0.0006 0.0094 0.0063* 
 (0.0065) (0.0051) (0.0086) (0.0011) (0.0100) (0.0027) 
       
Masters or Doctorate -0.0012 -0.0058 0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0177* 0.0037 
 (0.0054) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0077) (0.0038) 
       
Other -0.0070 0.0218*** -0.0091 0.0000 0.0452 0.0011 
 (0.0064) (0.0048) (0.0079) (0.0021) (0.0233) (0.0016) 
       
Constant 0.0444 0.0425 0.0376 0.0234 0.0523 -0.0206* 
 (0.0250) (0.0238) (0.0269) (0.0169) (0.0608) (0.0094) 
R2 0.175 0.244 0.260 0.128 0.275 0.262 
Observations 261 261 261 261 261 261 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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